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CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47(3): SHOULD
THERE BE A PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE IN
CALIFORNIA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout legal history there has been a heated tension between an
individual's right to redress injuries to reputation and the need to protect
publication of information concerning public issues. To regulate these
competing interests, our legal system has served as referee by providing
various privileges for communicators. If the conditions of a particular
privilege are met, then an otherwise libelous or slanderous publication or
statement is held not to be actionable. Privileges are extended to admit-
tedly defamatory communications for "the common convenience and
welfare of society" because "the good that may be accomplished by per-
mitting an individual to make a defamatory statement without fear of
liability for misinformation outweighs the harm that may be done to the
reputation of others."1 The privileges are founded in common-law prin-
ciples, state and federal statutes, and state and federal constitutional pro-
visions. These privileges can be either absolute2 or qualified.3
In California, Civil Code section 47(3)4 grants one such qualified
1. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 298 (1980). A defamatory
statement is an unprivileged publication which tends to "injure reputation; to diminish the
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 375
(5th ed. 1979).
2. An absolute privilege serves as a total bar to recovery "without regard to the fault or
mental state of the defendant." R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8.01[2], at 8-3 (1986).
For example, true statements are privileged in almost all jurisdictions, regardless of the defend-
ant's motives or failure to exercise due care.
3. One defamation law expert provided this description of a "qualified" or "conditional"
privilege:
"Conditional" or "qualified" privileges... involve speech deserving of some
enhanced protection, but not the complete immunity that accompanies absolute priv-
ileges. Common law conditional privileges do not attach to certain speakers or fo-
rums but are triggered by particular "occasions" or "contexts" in which the speech is
published, governed by the interrelationships between the speaker, the listener, the
victim, and the content of the speech. The protection of a conditional privilege is
forfeited if the privilege is "abused," which may, depending on the jurisdiction, mean
that the defamation was published with "common law (ill-will) malice," or "actual
malice" (knowing or reckless disregard of the truth), or published beyond the scope
of those who were legitimately entitled to receive it, or published with simple
negligence.
R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 8-4.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982).
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privilege to communicators. Section 47(3) provides that a privileged
publication or broadcast is one made:
In a communication, without malice, to a person inter-
ested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one
who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford
a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communi-
cation innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person inter-
ested to give the information.5
Section 47(3) was adopted in 1872 as a means of codifying the tradi-
tionally recognized common-law privilege for interested parties to com-
municate sensitive information among themselves.' Shortly after its
adoption, media defendants began citing section 47(3) as a defense to
defamation actions, claiming that the statute's concept of communica-
5. Id. When originally enacted in 1872, the code provision read:
A privileged publication is one made:
3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one
who was also interested, or who stood in such a relation to the former as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing his motive innocent, or who was requested by him
to give the information; ....
Id. (historical note). In 1873-1874, the provision was amended to read:
A privileged publication is one made:
Three-In a communication, without malice, to a person interest [sic] therein,
by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such a relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the commu-
nication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give the
information....
Id. (historical note). In 1945 the statute was amended to its present form. Id. (historical note).
6. Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 383-84, 22 P.2d 569, 570-71 (1933). A long line of
cases illustrates that the statute has been successful in this respect. See, e.g., Stationers Corp.
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965) (letter
published by mercantile agency discussing charges of irresponsibility made against the plain-
tiffs in litigation, and opinion by "legal authorities" that litigation had merit, held privileged);
Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Fed. Credit Union, 180 Cal. App. 3d 985, 995,
225 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1986) (communications "made in a commercial setting relating to the
conduct of an employee have been held to fall squarely within the qualified privilege for com-
munications to interested persons"); Williams v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, 181 Cal. Rptr.
423 (1982) (defendant's report to police that defendant suspected plaintiff of illegal conduct
while acting as manager of an automobile dealership held privileged); Martin v. Kearney, 51
Cal. App. 3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975) (letter from students' parents to school principal
complaining about the competence of a teacher held privileged); Gantry Constr. Co. v. Ameri-
can Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 186, 122 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1975) (phone call and letter
by defendant to bonding agency suggesting plaintiff was having financial problems held privi-
leged); Katz v. Rosen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 121 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975) (doctor's letter to a
local bar association charging an attorney with unethical conduct held privileged); Deaile v.
General Tel. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974) (report prepared by an
employee supervisor and addressed to corporate officials charging plaintiff with taking sick
leave under false pretenses held privileged).
PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
tions between interested parties applied to any published reports that ad-
dressed issues of public interest or concern,7 and that the statute
embodied California's version of the "fair comment" privilege.8 For
most of this century, California's legal system has been generally recep-
tive to this admittedly pro-publisher interpretation of section 47(3).
However, in the 1980 case of Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior
Court,9 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a long judicial
trend towards broadening the scope of the statute and unequivocally held
that section 47(3) does not confer upon the press a qualified privilege to
report on matters of public concern. A year later, in Rollenhagen v. City
of Orange,'0 the Fourth District Court of Appeal sharply challenged the
Rancho La Costa decision and expansively ruled that section 47(3) does,
in fact, provide the mass media with a qualified privilege to report on
issues of public interest.
For the past five years, no controversy has compelled the California
Supreme Court to reconcile these conflicting rulings. The discord in the
appellate courts was brought to the forefront, however, when former Ira-
nian hostage Jerry Plotkin filed a defamation action against the Van
Nuys Publishing Company and others.1 Because Van Nuys Publishing
and the other defendants have asserted a section 47(3) privilege in this
high-profile case, 2 the California Supreme Court will finally be presented
with an opportunity to enunciate a definitive rule on the scope of protec-
7. The argument of a general circulation newspaper would go something like this: the
newspaper's readers are the general public; the general public is interested in articles that
address matters of public concern, so the general public constitutes one half of the "interested
party" equation. The newspaper then qualifies as the other interested party because: (1) as a
servant of the public interest, the paper is also interested in the communication; (2) the paper,
as a mere objective reporter of the news, stands in such relation to the general public that one
could reasonably believe that the newspaper's motives are innocent; or (3) the paper has been
requested by readers, by way of subscriptions and other forms of patronage, to provide its
readers with articles of interest.
8. See Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135, 142
(1965); Comment, Fair Comment in California: An Unwelcome Guest, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 173
(1983). The fair comment privilege, under common law, was established to protect communi-
cations about matters of public concern. The privilege sprang from a recognition that" 'valua-
ble discourse might be furthered by intuitive, evaluative statements that could not be proved
either true or false by the rigorous deductive reasoning of the judicial process.' Concern for
the need to give some shelter to these evaluative statements was vented through limited protec-
tion for opinion.. . ." R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 6.02[l], at 6-4 to 6-5.
9. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
10. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-37 for a discussion of Plotkin v. Van Nuys Pub-
lishing Co., No. C 359 227 (Cal. Super. Ct. fied Mar. 4, 1981).
12. Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing
granted June 26, 1986).
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tion the statute provides. This Comment critically analyzes both the
Rancho La Costa and Rollenhagen decisions, and discusses the public
policy considerations implicated by each court's interpretation of section
47(3). Based on that analysis, this Comment recommends that the
supreme court adopt, as a decisional rule to apply in the pending case of
Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,13 an interpretation of section
47(3) that is in concert with the view expressed by the court in
Rollenhagen.
II. THE PLOTKIN CASE: FORCING A DEFINITIVE RULING ON
SECTION 47(3)
Jerry Plotkin, a resident of Sherman Oaks, California,1 4 went to
Iran in October 1979 to consummate a private business transaction.' 5
On the fourth day of November, Plotkin checked in with the United
States embassy in Tehran. For the next 444 days, Plotkin, along with
fifty-one other Americans, was held hostage by a group of Iranian ter-
rorists.16 Plotkin was the only private citizen kidnapped; because of his
distinctive status, the American people were uniquely interested in
Plotkin's reasons for being in Iran, and particularly in his reasons for
being at the American embassy at the time of the kidnapping. 7 During
his period of captivity, Plotkin assumed a highly visible role: he sent
communications to family members, media outlets, and even President
Jimmy Carter, encouraging the United States government to recognize
the terrorists' concerns in order to secure the hostages' release.' 8
On January 20, 1981, the hostages were finally freed and Plotkin
was on his way back to California.1 9 On January 21, The Daily News, a
newspaper generally circulated in the greater Los Angeles area,20 printed
an article suggesting that upon his return to the United States, Plotkin
13. Id.
14. Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Answer of Real
Party-in-Interest to Petition for Writs of Mandate and Prohibition at 3, Van Nuys Publishing
Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities].
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
17. Petitioner's Petition for Review at 7-8, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,
No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. petition for review filed Apr. 18, 1986); see also Petitioners'
Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 7-10, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior
Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986).
18. Petitioner's Petition for Review at 8, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No.
L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. petition for review filed Apr. 18, 1986).
19. Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 14, at 5.
20. At that time, the paper was published by the Tribune Company; the current publisher
is the Van Nuys Publishing Company.
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would be questioned by government authorities about his possible in-
volvement in narcotics trafficking in Iran. More specifically, the article
alleged: (1) that federal law enforcement officials expected the State De-
partment debriefing team to ask Plotkin if participation in a drug traffick-
ing operation explained his presence in Iran at the time of the hostage
crisis; (2) that Plotkin was being investigated by the Los Angeles Police
Department at the time he left the United States for Iran; (3) that Plotkin
was suspected of being a "heavyweight in cocaine and some heroin deal-
ing" in the Los Angeles area when he left for Iran; and (4) that Los
Angeles Police Department officers were anxious to quiz Plotkin about
his business dealings in Iran.2
Plotkin requested a retraction of the article but The Daily News re-
fused.22 Consequently, on March 4, 1981, Plotkin filed a defamation ac-
tion against the Tribune Company, the Van Nuys Publishing Company,
and Arnie Friedman and Adam Dawson, the two reporters who wrote
the article.23 A limited trial was commenced on January 15, 1986 to
determine what standard of fault Plotkin would have to prove in order to
recover actual damages.24 The defendants argued that Plotkin was a
public figure, and that this status obligated him to prove that the article
was published with "actual malice."2 5 Alternatively, the defendants
presented evidence that the Daily News article was of great public interest
at the time, and thus the article was protected by California Civil Code
section 47(3)'s26 qualified privilege.2 7 If section 47(3) did apply, Plotkin
21. Friedman & Dawson, Plotkin May Be Questioned in Drug Probe, The Daily News, Jan.
21, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
22. Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 14, at 7.
23. Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., No. C 359 227 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 4,
1981).
24. Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., No. C 359 227 (Cal. Super. Ct. mini-trial on
public figure and public interest issues, Jan. 15, 1986).
25. Trial Brief of Defendants Van Nuys Publishing Company and Tribune Company on
Trial to the Court of Certain Issues at 4-55, Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., No. C 359
227 (Cal. Super. Ct. mini-trial on public figure and public interest issues, Jan. 15, 1986) [here-
inafter Defendants' Trial Brief]. In a line of cases beginning with the landmark ruling in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that in
order to protect the type of political speech that is at the core of the first amendment, plaintiffs
classified as either public officials or public figures must prove that an allegedly defamatory
statement is false and that the statement was made by a media defendant with "actual malice."
Id. at 279-80. According to the Court, to prove "actual malice" the plaintiff must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the media defendant knew the statement to be false or acted
with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Id. See infra notes 224-38 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this important line of Supreme Court decisions.
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
27. Defendants' Trial Brief, supra note 25, at 69-80.
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could not recover absent a showing of malice as defined by California
law.28 Plaintiff Plotkin countered that he was a private figure and that
section 47(3) does not shield mass media reports concerning matters of
public concern. To support their respective positions, the defendants re-
lied on the holding in Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,29 and the plaintiff
cited as authority the ruling in Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court."
Superior Court Judge Christian E. Markey, Jr. found for plaintiff
Plotkin on both the public/private figure and section 47(3) issues.31 He
held that Plotkin was a private figure,32 meaning that under the United
States Constitution, Plotkin need only demonstrate some degree of fault
on the part of the defendants to recover actual damages.33 Judge Markey
also ruled that section 47(3) did not apply to the case at hand. He explic-
itly endorsed Rancho La Costa's interpretation of the statute,34 and re-
jected the broader view articulated by the court in Rollenhagen.35
The defendants appealed both holdings. On April 8, 1986, the Sec-
ond Appellate District denied review.36 Ultimately, the California
Supreme Court agreed to review the issue concerning the applicability of
section 47(3).37 The general question now before the court is: whether a
communication published in a newspaper of general circulation, which
concerns a matter of legitimate public interest and which defames a pri-
vate figure, is privileged under section 47(3) of the California Civil Code.
28. The California Civil Code defines "actual malice" as
that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintifi provided, how-
ever, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the
defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is pub-
lished or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(d) (West 1982). For a definition of actual malice under federal
constitutional law, see supra note 25.
29. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
30. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
31. Memorandum of Decision, Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., No. C 359 227 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Memorandum of Decision].
32. Id. at 1-2, 4-5.
33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figure plaintiff only
needs to prove that the defendant acted with fault, rather than constitutional actual malice, to
recover actual damages against a media defendant). For a discussion of Gertz, see infra notes
239-49 and accompanying text.
34. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 31, at 2. For a thorough analysis of Rancho La
Costa, see infra notes 38-126 and accompanying text.
35. Id. For a thorough analysis of Rollenhagen, see infra notes 153-89 and accompanying
text.
36. Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 2d Civil No. B019585 (Cal. Ct. App.
petition for review filed Mar. 24, 1986, petition denied Apr. 8, 1986).
37. Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing
granted June 26, 1986). Review was officially granted on June 26, but because of a clerical
error the court amended its order on July 2.
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To resolve this issue the court will have to critically examine both the
Rancho La Costa and Rollenhagen decisions.
III. THE CONFLICT IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL
A. Rancho La Costa: Repudiation of a Public Interest Privilege
The Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court38 decision significantly
altered the course of California Civil Code section 47(3)39 jurisprudence.
For decades, California's courts had incrementally broadened the dimen-
sions of the statute. Before Rancho La Costa, the judiciary had analyzed
the applicability of the statute to a libelous publication by first determin-
ing whether the subject matter of the publication was of legitimate public
concern. If the publication was deemed to be in the public interest, the
courts found the publication privileged under section 47(3), and forced
the plaintiff to overcome the privilege by proving malice under California
law. Rancho La Costa turned this decisional framework on its head.
The Rancho La Costa court not only refused to expand section
47(3)'s protections any further, but took a major step backward by nar-
rowly interpreting the scope of the statute's privilege. The court chose
not to emphasize the subject matter of the defamatory statement, but
microscopically focused on the individual status of the plaintiff. How-
ever, to justify this dramatic analytical shift, the court relied on old and
suspect authority, and summarily dismissed inconsistent holdings with-
out persuasive explanation.
1. Background
In Rancho La Costa, a Penthouse Magazine article accused the
plaintiffs-five corporations and four individuals associated with the La
Costa resort development-of having ties to organized crime. The indi-
vidual plaintiffs were described as being "mobsters, gangsters, [and]
members of organized crime," and the La Costa development was char-
acterized as a headquarters for organized crime.4' The article further
implicated the owners and the resort in nationwide bank failures, securi-
ties frauds totaling more than $50 billion, criminal misuse of Teamster
monies and pension funds and even in the Watergate scandal.a
After the plaintiffs filed a defamation action against Penthouse In-
38. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, cerL denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1980).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
40. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 165 Cal.- Rptr. at 349.
41. Id.
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ternational (Penthouse), the magazine moved for summary judgment, ar-
guing in part that the article was privileged under section 47(3) because
organized crime was a subject of legitimate public concern to the maga-
zine's readers.42 Ultimately, after several legal maneuvers and rulings,
the trial court held that the story was statutorily privileged. 43 The Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the protections of
section 47(3) were not activated merely because a publication "relates to
a matter which may have general public interest."'
Penthouse argued before the court of appeal that the statute's key
concept of "interested parties" was satisfied: Organized crime is a socie-
tal disease which can affect the daily lives of our citizens, and Penthouse,
by trying to identify some elements of that disease, was contributing to
the public interest.45 The court refused to accept this liberal interpreta-
tion of "interested parties," however, and held that for a communication
to benefit from the statute the subject matter must involve a concern that
represents more than "mere general or idle curiosity of the general read-
ership of newspapers and magazines."46 In the court's view, a privilege
42. Id.
43. Id. at 652, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The plaintiffs' original complaint was filed in 1975.
That same year, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs were public figures and that constitutional actual malice could not be shown. Judge Le-
Sage ruled that the plaintiffs were in fact public figures. Id. at 649-50, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 349-
50. However, Judge LeSage's holding was reconsidered in light of the United States Supreme
Court's timely holding in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (court held that wife of
member of famous family was not a public figure even though her divorce proceedings were
well-publicized, partly as a result of her own efforts). Upon reconsideration, Judge LeSage
granted summary judgment only with respect to two of the individual plaintiffs found to be
public figures. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The defend-
ants' application for a writ of mandate was denied by the Court of Appeal, the California
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Id. In 1977, the defendants again
moved for summary judgment, this time exclusively on § 47(3) grounds. Id. Judge Foster
denied the motion. Id. at 651, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 350. In 1978, the defendants filed a "motion
for determination of issues without substantial controversy," which was eventually withdrawn.
Id. After the dispute was finally assigned to Judge Dell, the defendants again moved for sum-
mary judgment. The ruling on this motion and the subsequent appeal led to the cited decision
of Rancho La Costa. Id.
44. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
45. Id. at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
46. Id. at 664-65, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The court, however, failed to explain why the
topic of organized crime only appealed to the "general or idle curiosity" of Penthouse's read-
ers. In Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.
1971), a federal district court declared that:
There can be no doubt that organized crime is a subject about which the public
has an interest and a right to be informed. The vast expenditures of money by all
branches of government, both state and federal, into the workings and extent of or-
ganized crime indicates the interest of the public, as well as its right to know or be
informed.
Id. at 1073. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the subject of organized crime is
1566
PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
applies only to communications between two parties that satisfy a rela-
tively restrictive definitional model. To qualify as "interested parties"
under the statute, the court stated, the parties involved must share some
type of contractual, business or similar relationship such as that enjoyed
"'between partners, corporate officers and members of incorporated as-
sociations,' or between 'union members [and] union officers.' " Fur-
thermore, the court held that a party can only be "interested" in a
communication if the communication would contribute to the protection
of a pecuniary or proprietary interest.48 Finally, the court stated that the
communication must be requested "in the course of a business or profes-
sional relationship."'49
2. Precedent employed by the court
To support its narrow view of section 47(3), and in response to Pent-
house's arguments in support of a broader construction of the statute, the
Rancho La Costa court cited several cases, principally relying on the rul-
ing in Gilman v. McClatchy.5 ° In Gilman, the California Supreme Court
held that newspapers do not enjoy a privilege to report on any matters
that the public has a "right" to know."1 At issue in that litigation was an
article in the Evening Bee, a newspaper published by defendant C.K.
McClatchy, which falsely charged that plaintiff Charles Gilman as-
saulted and attempted to rape a woman.52 In defense, McClatchy argued
that the story was reported in good faith and should be privileged be-
cause the report concerned a matter of public concern. McClatchy's
counsel contended that it was a "fundamental postulate" of California
law that a newspaper has a right to print and publish "whatever every
citizen has a right to know ....
The Gilman court rejected McClatchy's argument, declaring that
recognition of such a "fundamental postulate" would have the practical
effect of immunizing the press from any liability stemming from the pub-
lication of defamatory material. 54 The court stated that the defendant's
interpretation of libel law could be reduced to a highly self-serving opera-
one "of the utmost importance to the people of this country .... " Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449
F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1971).
47. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (citing 4 B. WrrmiN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS §§ 306-309 (8th ed. 1974)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 111 Cal. 606, 44 P. 241 (1896).
51. Id. at 612-14, 44 P. at 242-43.
52. Id. at 609, 44 P. at 241.
53. Id. at 612, 44 P. at 242.
54. Id. at 613, 44 P. at 242.
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tional model: "that a newspaper is a purveyor of news; the people have
the right to read the news; any story gleaned by a reporter as this was
gleaned, and published in the ordinary course of newspaper business
without personal malevolence against the victim of the tale, should be
held privileged.""5 The court declared that "[i]n support of this conten-
tion there is neither authority, law, nor justice."56 The Rancho La Costa
opinion further asserted that Gilman's 1896 holding had been reaffirmed
in recent California cases.5 7
Gilman is unpersuasive authority for a narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 47(3) for several reasons. First, the Gilman court considered itself
bound by the holding in Wilson v. Fitch,58 an 1871 California Supreme
Court decision. In that case, the supreme court held that good faith re-
ports of matters of public interest were not privileged. The source of the
litigation was an article in the Evening Bulletin, a San Francisco newspa-
55. Id. at 613-14, 44 P. at 242-43.
56. Id. at 614, 44 P. at 243. The court did seem to suggest that reports concerning public
officials would benefit from a qualified privilege: "No point of similarity can be found between
this case and those which protect a publisher who in good faith discusses the habits, qualifica-
tions, and official conduct of a person holding a public office or presenting himself as a candi-
date therefor." Id.
57. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 666, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The only case cited
by the court in support of this claim was Peoples v. Tautfest, 274 Cal. App. 2d 630, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 478 (1969). In that case, defendant Willard Tautfest and others, in an attempt to solicit
signatures for a recall petition against a certain member of the city council, told voters that
plaintiffLorine Peoples served liquor to boys while employed by the city as a recreation direc-
tor, and that the city councilman had nevertheless defended Peoples' actions. Id. at 633, 79
Cal. Rptr. at 480. The court held that these communications about Peoples, a private figure,
were not privileged because Tautfest and his colleagues were not directing the information at
interested parties. Id. at 637, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83. Those that heard the remarks did not
solicit them, and had no objective interest in them; the communication of the information
served only the interests of Tautfest. The court alternatively noted that the allegations against
Peoples "did not relate directly to the conduct of a public officer or employee or of a candidate
for public office." Id., 79 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
However, the Rancho La Costa court's reliance on Tautfest as a reaffirmation of the nar-
row holding in Gilman is flawed. First, the Tautfest opinion made no mention of Gilman, a
curious omission if the decision was supposed to be a reaffirmance. Second, Tautfest is not
even analogous to Gilman because the case did not involve a media publisher that disseminated
news to a subscribing public. In Tautest, the key factor was not the fact that the plaintiff was
a private figure; the key was that the communications were completely unsolicited. Id., 79 Cal.
Rptr. at 482-83. Because the people who heard the allegedly defamatory statements about
Peoples did not seek out the information, and were therefore not at all intrinsically interested
in the matter, the court held that they could not be considered interested parties. Id. A news-
paper or magazine, on the other hand, is only read by people who have purchased the publica-
tion because they are interested in the information contained therein. Furthermore, newspaper
and magazine readers expect-even demand-to find information concerning their public wel-
fare within the pages of the publication.
58. 41 Cal. 363 (1871) (court held that newspaper account alleging that plaintiff had swin-
dled local mine investors was not privileged).
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per, which accused plaintiff John Wilson of swindling investors in a local
mine.59 The defendant argued that the article was a good faith report of
a matter of great public interest and concern and should therefore be
privileged.' The court was not persuaded, declaring that a defamatory
publication in a public journal is not privileged "simply because it relates
to a subject of public interest, and was published in good faith, without
malice, and from laudable motives. 61 The court stated that no adjudi-
cated case had ever acknowledged such a sweeping privilege, and that if
such a privilege were recognized, "there would be but little security for
private character.
'62
However, since Wilson was decided a full year before section 47(3)
was adopted, the Wilson court's ruling could hardly be considered any
kind of a statement concerning the statute's scope. Although an argu-
ment can be made that Wilson was the quintessential statement of the
common law which the California Legislature sought to codify when it
drafted section 47(3), one can just as easily posit that the Legislature
adopted the statute as a means of recognizing a privilege which the judi-
ciary in Wilson refused to acknowledge.6 3 Thus, by virtue of its reliance
59. Id. at 365-72.
60. Id. at 382.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 383. However, the court did admit that there were some justifications for a
public interest privilege:
The public interest, and a due regard to the freedom of the press, demands that its
conductors should not be mulcted in punitive damages for publications on subjects of
public interest, made from laudable motives, after due inquiry as to the truth of the
facts stated, and in the honest belief that they were true.
Id.
63. Because no legislative history exists for § 47(3), speculative arguments about the Cali-
fornia Legislature's "intent" are inevitable. This Comment intentionally avoids the statutory
interpretation issue because the California Supreme Court could use available rules of con-
struction to justify either a Rancho La Costa or Rollenhagen approach. For arguments in
support of a narrow statutory construction of § 47(3), see Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Support of Answer of Real Party-In-Interest To Petition for Writs of Mandate and
Prohibition at 17-23, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986); Response of Real Party-In-Interest to Amici Curiae Brief
of the Times-Mirror Company, McClatchy Newspapers, The Copley Press, Inc., and National
Broadcasting Company, Inc. at 7-9, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A.
32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986); Plaintiff's Closing Memorandum Re
Private Figure and "Public Interest" Issues at 2-7, Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., No. C
359 227 (Cal. Super. Ct. mini-trial on public figure and public interest issues Jan. 16, 1986).
For arguments in support of a broad statutory construction of § 47(3), see Petitioners' Reply
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 11-19, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,
No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986); Amici Curiae Brief of the Times
Mirror Company, McClatchy Newspapers, The Copley Press, Inc., and National Broadcasting
Company, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 26-31, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,
No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986).
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on the unconvincing and inapplicable ruling in Wilson, Gilman is ren-
dered questionable authority at best.
The second flaw in Rancho La Costa's reliance on Gilman is that the
Gilman opinion failed to embellish its holding with any substantive legal
analysis. No policy arguments were offered to justify the court's sweep-
ing repudiation of any public interest privilege except for a rambling
quote from a Michigan decision, McAllister v. Detroit Free Press.6" The
cited passage from McAllister essentially stated that newspapers should
not be subjected to lesser liability standards just because the public thirsts
for news." Yet this statement is hardly an indictment of a public interest
privilege. Even the most zealous public interest privilege proponents
would agree that newspaper publishers should not be allowed to define
the standards of their own liability by their subjective judgment of what
is newsworthy. However, it does not follow that articles which are objec-
tively newsworthy precisely because they deal with truly compelling pub-
lic issues should deserve lesser legal protection simply because they also
satisfy the public's "curiosity." Furthermore, the McAllister decision
was not interpreting section 47(3) nor any similar Michigan statute, so its
usefulness in interpreting a California statutory privilege is suspect.
66
Another decision cited by the Rancho La Costa court as authority
64. 76 Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 431 (1889) (article which falsely accused plaintiff of commit-
ting a felony held actionable because communications are only privileged if the communicator
seeks to protect his own interest, or if the communication is made in the context of the per-
formance of a public or official duty, or if the communication is directed at an officer who
possesses the power to redress a grievance).
65. Gilman, Ill Cal. at 614-15, 44 P. at 243 (quoting McAllister v. Detroit Free Press, 76
Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 431 (1889)). The McAllister court stated:
It is argued that a newspaper in this day and age of the world, when people are
hungry for the news, and almost every person is a newspaper reader, must be allowed
some latitude and more privilege than is ordinarily given under the law of libel as it
has heretofore been understood. In other words, because the world is thirsting for
criminal items, and the libel in a newspaper is more far-reaching and widespread
than it used to be when tales were only spread by the mouth, or through the medium
of books or letters, there should be given greater immunity to gossip in the newspa-
per, although the harm to the person injured is infinitely greater than it would be if
published otherwise.
The greater the circulation the greater the wrong, and the more reason why
greater care should be exercised in the publication of personal items. No newspaper
has any right to trifle with the reputation of any citizen, or by carelessness or reck-
lessness to injure his good name and fame or business.
McAllister, 76 Mich. at 355-56, 43 N.W. at 437.
66. McAllister is not even good law in Michigan anymore, for the state now recognizes a
public interest privilege. See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266
N.W.2d 693 (1978) (qualified privilege to report on matters of public interest can only be
overcome by defendant's proving of actual malice); see also Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d
1108, 1113 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Michigan law) ("As a story about a matter of public
concern, the article is protected under state law by the qualified privilege of 'fair comment.' ").
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for the proposition that section 47(3) does not apply to general press re-
ports addressing matters of public interest was Newby v. Times-Mirror
Co.67 In Newby, the court held that a newspaper could not justify defam-
ing a private figure by claiming the defamatory remarks were published
in the course of the newspaper's fulfillment of its duty to report the
news. 8 Newby, however, is no better authority than Gilman because
Newby, too, chiefly relied on Wilson v. Fitch6 9 and Gilman itself.0
A third case the Rancho La Costa court relied on was the California
Supreme Court's holding in Earl v. Times-Mirror Co.7 However, the
issue in that case was whether the plaintiff, as a public figure,72 was de-
serving of lesser legal protections than a private figure. 73 The defendants
in Earl did not even advance section 47(3) as a specific defense.
3. The court's attempt to distinguish adverse authority
After relying upon Gilman, Newby and Earl to support its narrow
construction of section 47(3),74 the Rancho La Costa opinion next at-
67. 46 Cal. App. 110, 188 P. 1008 (1920).
68. Id. at 120, 188 P. at 1012. Plaintiff Nathan Newby, a prominent lawyer, sued the Los
Angeles Times for publishing a cartoon which portrayed him as a hypocrite. Id. at 115-16, 188
P. at 1010. The court stated that:
The duty of a newspaper to the public does not justify the publication of false and
defamatory matter concerning a private citizen merely because he is active in pro-
moting his own political views. A publication concerning such person, if libelous in
its nature... can be justified only by pleading and proving that it is true. And the
fact that the matter published tends to cause merriment, or is a "facetious rejoinder"
to adverse criticisms made by other persons, does not justify the wrong.
Id. at 120, 188 P. at 1012.
69. Id. (citing Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363 (1871)).
70. Id. (citing Gilman v. McClatchey, 111 Cal. 606, 44 P. 241 (1896)). The Newby court
also cited Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Publishing Soe'y, 99 Cal. 431, 34 P. 128 (1893), as
authority. Newby, 46 Cal. App. at 120, 188 P. at 1012. In Edwards, the court affirmed a libel
judgment for plaintiff Edwards, who was described by an article in defendant's newspaper as
being in charge of a "sack"-a warchest to be used for political corruption. Edwards, 99 Cal.
at 434, 34 P. at 129. However, the Edwards court relied on previously discredited decisions
(Wilson and McAllister) and failed to even mention § 47(3) in its opinion.
71. 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921) (fact that plaintiff was prominent publisher of two
newspapers held, as a matter of law, to have no effect on standard of fault requirements to be
applied in a defamation action).
72. The plaintiff, E.T. Earl, was a well-known publisher of two newspapers. Earl, 185 Cal.
at 167, 196 P. at 58-59.
73. Id. at 196-97, 196 P. at 70-71.
74. Surprisingly, the Rancho La Costa court did not mention two somewhat supportive
rulings. In Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 216 P. 371 (1923), the California Supreme Court
specifically held that § 47(3) did not immunize the media from liability for defamatory re-
marks about a private citizen who actively promoted his own political views. The source of the
suit in Stevens was a newspaper article which reported that the plaintiff had laid bad pavement,
that he was employed in a job with no real responsibilities, that he was indicted and acquitted
by a grand jury for an offense and that his close relationship with a judge had resulted in a
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tempted to distinguish all adverse authority presented to the court by
Penthouse. The court casually grouped the proffered cases into two im-
mensely broad and ultimately unsatisfactory categories: the court stated
that all the cases cited by Penthouse either (1) involved plaintiffs who
were public officials, or (2) involved publications that were targeted at a
specialized audience or that addressed issues of peculiar local concern.
Because the Penthouse article did not concern a public official, because
Penthouse is not a special interest publication, and because the article's
subject matter-organized crime-was not of peculiar local concern to
Penthouse's readers, the Rancho La Costa court held that none of the
cases were persuasive. However, this conclusion requires an extremely
restrictive reading of the cases cited by Penthouse. A closer inspection of
Rancho La Costa's categorizations exposes the weaknesses in the court's
reasoning.
a. the 'public official" distinction
The Rancho La Costa court considered the first group of cases sub-
mitted by Penthouse unpersuasive because in each instance the plaintiffs
were public officials. The holdings in Snively v. Record Publishing Co.,7-
Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co.76 and Everett v. California Teachers Asso-
ciation" were included in this classification."
favorable judgment in a previous defamation action. Id. at 332, 216 P. at 372. The court
conceded that § 47(3) applied to reports concerning the conduct of "local public officers," but
refused to extend the reach of the privilege to a private figure. Id. at 337, 216 P. at 374.
In Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263 P. 812 (1928), the supreme court again hinted that
it preferred to read the statute narrowly. Although the court in Maher found an article accus-
ing the mayor of Santa Cruz of mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds to be
privileged under § 47(3), the court ruled that the key to the decision was the plaintiff's status
as a public officer. Id. at 282, 263 P. at 817. The opinion expressly noted that the defendant's
status as a general circulation newspaper had no bearing on the determination of an applicable
privilege. Id.
75. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921) (cartoon portraying chief of police as dishonest public
official held privileged because conduct of public officers is of interest to every citizen officers
serve).
76. 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942) (article in national magazine discussing
educational policy held privileged because subject matter was of public interest).
77. 208 Cal. App. 2d 291, 25 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962) (article discussing competence of pub-
lic school teacher held privileged because subject matter was of public concern).
78. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 666, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360. For other cases not
discussed by Rancho La Costa which applied § 47(3) against public official plaintiffs, see
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 27-28, 459 P.2d 912, 915-16, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363.64
(1969) (editorial suggesting city council candidate should withdraw from race because her
children were receiving inadequate parental attention held privileged under § 47(3); however,
privilege eclipsed by showing of malice); Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 384, 22 P.2d 569,
571 (1933) (newspaper article written by former city council member concerning qualifications
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One cannot dispute the fact that all three of these cases involved
plaintiffs who were public officials. But what the Rancho La Costa court
failed to appreciate about these decisions is the way the plaintiff's status
as a public official simplified the "interested party" analysis under section
47(3). Public officials, by definition, deal with matters of immediate con-
cern to the citizens who elect them. The California Supreme Court, in
Snively, 79 clearly recognized this: "the official conduct of public officers,
especially in a government by the people, is a matter ofpublic concern of
which every citizen may speak in good faith and without malice."80 Be-
cause any activity of a public official is therefore inherently a matter of
public concern, the courts, beginning with Snively, have had no trouble
concluding that defamatory articles dealing with public officials are privi-
leged under section 47(3) because they are of obvious and unquestioned
public interest.
The Snively court explicitly stated that articles concerning public
officials are privileged not because of some special "fair comment" privi-
lege which can only be triggered by the involvement of a public official,
but because these types of publications fit nicely within section 47(3)'s
concept of communications between interested parties:
Since the conduct of public officers in the administration of
their offices is a matter in which every citizen of the community
which they serve is interested, the publication in question, if
otherwise privileged, must be considered as one made to per-
sons interested, and on an occasion which would ordinarily af-
ford reasonable grounds for supposing that it was made from
innocent motives. 1
The reasoning employed by the Snively court clearly conflicts with
the notion that all articles in general circulation publications concerning
of city council candidate held privileged because "fair criticism of public officials is within the
privilege of § 47(3) of the Civil Code").
79. In Snively, the California Supreme Court reversed a libel judgment which was in favor
of plaintiff Snively, a police chief. The court held that the libelous communication was be-
tween interested parties and was therefore rendered privileged under § 47(3). The source of
the controversy was a cartoon printed in the Los Angeles Record, a daily general circulation
newspaper, which depicted Snively as a dishonest public official who secretly received money
for unlawful purposes. Snively, 185 Cal. at 569, 198 P. at 2. Record Publishing Company
argued that the publication was privileged because the cartoon, by discussing the conduct of a
public official, was in the public interest. Ma The court agreed, and ruled that § 47(3) was the
claimed privilege's appropriate source, id. at 570, 198 P. at 3, because the communication was
between interested parties: Snively served the community where the Record was circulated;
therefore, the Record's publication communicated information concerning Snively to readers
who would be genuinely interested in Snively's conduct. Id. at 572, 198 P. at 3.
80. Id. at 571, 198 P. at 3 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 572, 198 P. at 3 (emphasis added).
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private figure plaintiffs are necessarily outside the scope of the privilege,
as the Rancho La Costa holding suggests. Under the Snively rationale, if
a private individual became embroiled in a controversy of true public
concern, the mass media would be able to freely report on that matter
just as they would be able to freely report on any event dominated by a
public official. The key to the ruling in Snively was the content of the
article, not the defamed party's status as a public official.
This analytical approach of interpreting section 47(3) by focusing on
the subject matter of the article rather than the plaintiff's public or pri-
vate status was also clearly evident in Harris, where a school board presi-
dent was the allegedly defamed party. There, plaintiff Harris, who was
also a Laguna Beach businessman, sued Curtis Publishing over an article
in the Saturday Evening Post. The article, in the broader context of dis-
cussing educational policies throughout the nation, associated the cancel-
lation of a banking education program in Laguna Beach's public school
system with the prevalence of communism in the area.82 In finding the
Post article privileged under section 47(3), the Harris court first posited
that articles published in a nationally distributed magazine detailing
events in even relatively obscure communities could benefit from section
47(3)'s protections if the article concerned an issue of potential interest to
some of the magazine's readers:
There is a wide difference between a publication respecting
a matter of purely local concern which is mainly circulated
outside the interested area and to people having no interest
therein, and one involving a matter of public policy or eco-
nomic theory which, while arising in a local community, is di-
rectly connected with and may vitally affect the habits, modes
of living and economic views of people throughout the nation.
There is a marked distinction between the making of such a
purely local attack and a comment upon political views and
policies the effect of which cannot, from their very nature, be
confined to any locality. There was evidence here that the re-
spondents were interested in the educational systems of the na-
tion and the various states, and in the opinions and theories
used in connection with the education and training of our
82. Harris, 49 Cal. App. 2d at 344, 121 P.2d at 763. The article's only reference to Harris
was the publication of a statement made by Harris at a local meeting of the Rotary Club.
According to the article, Harris rhetorically asked the Rotary members, "Why should kids
save, anyway? We are going to have old-age pensions, and kids should spend their money and
let the government take care of them when they are old." Id. (quoting Saturday Evening Post).
After mentioning this quote, the Post article went on to say that "Laguna Beach includes
several hundred Communists.... ." Id.
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young people and that some of the readers of the Post were also
interested in such matters.
8 3
The Harris court then concluded that questions regarding whether
banking practices should be encouraged in public schools and whether an
individual is a communist are of practically universal interest, and there-
fore the article in the Post was directed at an interested party-the gen-
eral public-within the conceptual parameters of section 47(3).84 Thus,
Harris established that a general circulation publication could invoke
section 47(3)'s protections for any article that addressed an issue of pub-
lic concern, whatever the plaintiff's status. Notably, the court did not
even mention the fact that the plaintiff, as a school board president, was a
"public official."85
In Everett, the third case distinguished by the Rancho La Costa
court under the public official heading, plaintiff David Everett was a
school district official who brought suit against an educational associa-
tion and certain individuals over a published report that criticized Ever-
ett's professional performance.86 As in Snively and Harris, the court held
that the subject matter of the article, and not the plaintiff's status as a
public official, was the critical determinant: "A publication seeking to
convey pertinent information to the public in matters of public interest
comes within the purview of the privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdi-
vision 3.87
Finally, the decision of Williams v. Daily Review, Inc.8" clearly dis-
credits Rancho La Costa's dismissal of Snively, Harris and Everett on the
singular ground that the plaintiffs in those three cases were public offi-
cials. The Williams court pointedly rejected the notion that section
47(3)'s protections were functionally related to the plaintiff's status:
"[T]he scope of the term 'public interest' in California is not limited to
matters relating solely to public officials." 89 The court noted that in two
83. Id. at 350, 121 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. This is significant because, according to Gilman and Rancho La Costa, the plaintiff's
status as a public official is the only way the statute's protections can be invoked by a general
circulation newspaper or magazine. Hence, the Harris decision serves as clearly contrary
authority.
86. Everett, 208 Cal. App. 2d at 293-94, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
87. Id. at 294, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (emphasis added) (citing Howard v. Southern Cal.
Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 584, 213 P.2d 399, 402 (1950) (letter to editor discussing
political race held privileged because "publications by which it is sought to convey pertinent
information to the public in matters of public interest are permitted wide latitude")).
88. 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965) (newspaper article alleging that local
contractor was behind schedule on city paving project held privileged under § 47(3)).
89. Id. at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (emphasis added).
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prior cases,90 the section 47(3) privilege had been applied where the sub-
ject matter of the article was determined to be of public interest and
where the defamed individual was well-known among a certain interest
group.
91
b. the 'pecial interest publication" distinction
Other rulings cited by Penthouse were grouped into a second broad
category by the court in Rancho La Costa and discounted as unpersua-
sive because they all supposedly involved publications that were "limited
to a local or a special interest group and related to matters of special
concern."92  With this one casual comment, the court swept away de-
cades of analysis supporting a public interest interpretation of section
47(3).93
90. The court cited Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946), and
Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960).
For a discussion of Glenn, see infra text accompanying notes 106-14; for a discussion of
Maidman, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
91. Williams, 236 Cal. App. 2d at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
92. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Included in this
category of cases were: Maidman, 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (editorial
printed in Anglo-Jewish newspaper criticizing a prominent member of the Southern California
Jewish community held privileged under § 47(3) as a communication between interested par-
ties); Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948) (publication in
national Baptist newspaper detailing expulsion charges against church members deemed privi-
leged under § 47(3) as a communication between interested parties); Toney v. State, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976) (press release concerning suspension of professor at
public university held to be actionable because plaintiff's showing of malice overcame a § 47(3)
privilege); Williams, 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (newspaper report that contrac-
tor was behind schedule in completing paving project deemed privileged under § 47(3) because
matter was of public concern); Glenn, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (article reporting
arrest of seven servicemen at alleged brothel held privileged under § 47(3) because activities of
servicemen during times of war are of public interest); and Heuer v. Kee, 15 Cal. App. 2d 710,
59 P.2d 1063 (1936) (resolution calling for removal of a public teacher held privileged under
§ 47(3) because subject matter was of public concern).
93. See, eg., Maidman, 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (editorial printed in
Anglo-Jewish newspaper criticizing prominent member of the Southern California Jewish
community held privileged as a communication between interested parties); Brewer, 32 Cal. 2d
791, 197 P.2d 713 (publication in national Baptist newspaper detailing expulsion charges
against church members deemed privileged as a communication between interested parties);
Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943) (article
in labor journal addressing labor policies of local business held privileged as a communication
between interested parties); Snively, 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (cartoon portraying chief of police
as dishonest public official held privileged because conduct of public officers is of interest to
every citizen they serve); Williams, 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (report that con-
tractor was behind schedule in completing paving project deemed privileged because matter
was of public concern); Glenn, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (article reporting arrest of
seven servicemen at alleged brothel held privileged because activities of servicemen during
times of war are of public interest); Harris, 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (article in
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Some of the cases cited by Penthouse did involve special interest
groups and special interest publications. For example, in Brewer v. Sec-
ond Baptist Church,94 a letter was distributed to members of a church
congregation detailing charges which church officials believed justified
the expulsion of two members. After the members were officially ex-
pelled, a report of the circumstances surrounding the expulsions was re-
leased to the press and ultimately printed in the National Baptist Voice, a
nationally circulated Baptist newspaper.95 The California Supreme
Court found the article privileged under section 47(3) because "the com-
mon interest of the members of a church in church matters is sufficient to
give rise to a qualified privilege to communications between members on
subjects relating to the church's interest.
96
Similarly, in Maidrnan v. Jewish Publications, Inc.97 the source of
the alleged libel was an editorial printed in the B'nai B'rith Messenger, a
weekly Anglo-Jewish newspaper published by the defendant and distrib-
uted primarily in Los Angeles County. The editorial criticized plaintiff
Samuel Maidman, a prominent Jewish attorney, for calling a solemn
Jewish holiday a joyous occasion and for persuading a judge to deny a
request for a continuance out of respect for the holiday.98 As in Brewer,
the supreme court ruled that the publication was privileged because the
editorial was targeted at members of the Jewish community who would
be legitimately interested in Maidman's remarks and actions.99
While a special interest publication which addresses the concerns of
a tightly defined group may seem distinguishable from a national publi-
cation like Penthouse, the same logic which serves to legally protect the
former under section 47(3) also extends to the latter. Penthouse obvi-
ously has a more diverse readership than a church newspaper, but that
only means that to qualify for protection under the statute, the article in
question must be of such universal interest and importance as to be of
comparable concern to that diverse readership. In essence, the underly-
ing justification used by the California Supreme Court in Brewer and
national magazine discussing Laguna Beach school board policies held privileged under
§ 47(3)); Heuer, 15 Cal. App. 2d 710, 59 P.2d 1063 (school board resolution alleging that
teacher is unfit held privileged under § 47(3)).
94. 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713.
95. Id. at 793-96, 197 P.2d at 715-16.
96. Id. at 796, 197 P.2d at 717. The court held for the plaintiff, however, because the
publication was made with malice,
97. 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617.
98. Id. at 646-47, 355 P.2d at 266-67, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. The Jewish holiday at the
source of the controversy was Rosh Hashanah, which is considered, along with Yom Kippur,
to be one of the most solemn of the religion's holidays.
99. Id. at 651-52, 355 P.2d at 269, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
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Maidman was the same argument advanced by Penthouse in Rancho La
Costa: an article in any type of publication should be privileged under
section 47(3) so long as the article pertains to a matter of legitimate inter-
est to a significant number of the publication's readers and so long as the
purpose of the article is to protect or further that interest."° To illus-
trate, the court's analysis in Maidman can easily and logically be ex-
tended to general circulation newspapers or magazines: a Los Angeles
Times article concerning a prominent Southern California attorney who
refused to properly appreciate the significance of a national holiday like
Martin Luther King Day would be of great interest to the readers of a
widely-circulated paper like the Times, and should therefore be
privileged.
Other decisions distinguished by Rancho La Costa involved even
narrower communications than the special interest journals at issue in
Brewer and Maidman. In Heuer v. Kee, 101 a school board resolution call-
ing for the removal of a Los Angeles public school teacher was the source
of the alleged libel.102 When the teacher brought a defamation action
against the author of the resolution, the court found the resolution privi-
100. In Emde, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20, a decision ignored by the court in Rancho La
Costa, the California Supreme Court noted that "greater protection is accorded one who
makes a statement, in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose, to persons having a
common interest with him in the subject matter of the communication, when the publication is
of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it." Id. at 154, 143 P.2d at 25.
The source of the dispute in Emde was an article in the Stockton Labor Journal which
accused plaintiffs George Emde and Lois Marshall, owners of a dairy business, of violating a
contract with a local chapter of the Teamsters union, of hiring non-union drivers, and, in
general, of adopting a "destructive labor policy." Id. at 149, 143 P.2d at 22-23. The article
encouraged readers not to patronize Emde and Marshall's business. Id. at 148, 143 P.2d at 22.
The court found the article privileged under § 47(3) as one between interested parties. Id.
at 161, 143 P.2d at 28. Although the opinion justified this finding on the grounds that the
newspaper exclusively addressed the interests of organized labor, and the article in question
involved a labor controversy, id., it would be unreasonable to limit the scope of the holding to
the facts of the case. The court's rationale applies with equal persuasiveness to a general circu-
lation newspaper which publishes an article of national significance. For example, an editorial
in the New York Times which encouraged its readership not to patronize a particular domestic
automobile manufacturer because of its anti-labor policies would be of interest to its entire
readership because all readers are consumers and many are also members of labor unions.
This was the same analysis the court used in Harris to find that an article published in the
Saturday Evening Post concerning public school policies in Laguna Beach was privileged under
§ 47(3). See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
101. 15 Cal. App. 2d 710, 59 P.2d 1063.
102. A newspaper story charged that plaintiff M.A. Heuer, the school teacher, broke a
boy's tooth by striking him on the back after she discovered that he was cheating on an exami-
nation. Defendant Kee, the father of two students enrolled in the school where Heuer taught,
placed before the city council a resolution calling for Heuer's dismissal, alleging that she was
unfit to be a teacher. The resolution cited the incident reported in the newspaper article as an
example of Heuer's inability to exercise self-control. Id. at 712-13, 59 P.2d at 1063-64.
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leged under section 47(3). However, the Heuer court made no effort to
limit its holding to the narrow circumstances of the case. In fact, the
court stressed not the special interest nature of the publication, but in-
stead focused on the public's interest in the resolution: "The conduct of
appellant in the discharge of her duties as a teacher was a matter ofpub-
lic concern, and there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial court in
concluding that the publication of the matter complained of was.., for
the public benefit." 03 Thus the Heuer case is another example of judicial
emphasis on the subject matter of the communication rather than the
plaintiff's public or private status or the general or special interest circu-
lation characteristics of the publication.
Toney v. State of California,"° another decision distinguished by
Rancho La Costa, also involved a publication of a limited nature: a press
release discussing the suspension of a college professor at a public univer-
sity, and related disciplinary and possible criminal proceedings. How-
ever, the Toney opinion barely discussed section 47(3), and could in no
way be construed as a narrow interpretation of the statute.105
The final two cases distinguished under the local or special interest
group label, Glenn v. Gibson 106 and Williams v. Daily Review, Inc.," °7
clearly involved broader holdings than the Rancho La Costa court recog-
nized. By failing to address these two critical decisions in a more sub-
stantial manner, the court greatly compromised the persuasive force of
its ruling.
In Glenn, the court expansively held that under section 47(3) a
newspaper could, without malice, print a libelous communication about
a private businessman if the subject matter was of concern to the pub-
lic.108 In this 1946 case, an article in the Times-Herald, a newspaper
published by defendant Luther Gibson, detailed the arrest of seven ser-
vicemen and seven "ladies of the night" at a hotel owned by plaintiff
Helen Glenn.109 A picture of Glenn's hotel was published in the newspa-
per a few days later and the caption described the building as a "drive-in
103. Id. at 715, 59 P.2d at 1065 (emphasis added).
104. 54 Cal. App. 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869.
105. The Toney court only stated that "Toney concedes that State was prima facie entitled
to protection of the privilege with respect to the press release... ." Id. at 793, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 878. The court then concluded that the defendant's claim to the privilege was disqualified
upon the plaintiff's showing of malice in the form of conduct motivated by hatred or ill will.
Id. at 793-94, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
106. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118.
107. 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135.
108. Glenn, 75 Cal. App. 2d at 659, 171 P.2d at 124.
109. Id. at 651, 171 P.2d at 119.
June 1987] 1579
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1559
house of prostitution.""'  Subsequent articles kept the public apprised of
legal proceedings stemming from the raid."'
The court found that Glenn's complaint "on its face" showed that
the communications in the Times-Herald fell within the scope of section
47(3)'s protections. The court held that because the articles concerned
the activities of United States military personnel during World War II,
and were published in a community where extensive war activities were
conducted, the subject matter of the Times-Herald articles was "a matter
of vital concern to every right-thinking person.'"112 The court underscored
its adherence to a public interest interpretation of the statute by citing
the Restatement of Torts, which at that time read in part that "[a]n occa-
sion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a correct
or reasonable belief that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently impor-
tant public interest.... "113
Rancho La Costa's classification of the Glenn case as one involving
nothing more than a local group is almost absurd. Military personnel,
especially during a time of national mobilization, could not be considered
simply a local or special interest group, and their conduct is not of any
more "special" concern than the conduct of any individual or group who
has any degree of public responsibility. Furthermore, the court in Glenn
did not hold that only local citizens would be interested in the activities
of the servicemen, but rather found that any "right-thinking person"
would be concerned.' 14 Under the Glenn rationale, the same story, if
printed in the Los Angeles Times rather than the local paper, would still
be privileged under the statute.
In Williams v. Daily Review, Inc.,' a case decided almost twenty
years after Glenn, the court held that a newspaper account suggesting a
local contractor was behind schedule on a public project was privileged
under section 47(3). 116 At issue in the case was an article published in
The Daily Review, a newspaper predominantly circulated in Southern Al-
ameda County." 7 The article charged that plaintiff Anthony Williams'
construction firm was behind schedule in completing a paving project for
the city, impliedly because of incompetence.1 8 The court, in finding the
110. Id at 652, 171 P.2d at 120.
111. Id. at 652-57, 171 P.2d at 120-23.
112. Id. at 659, 171 P.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598 (1938)).
114. Id.
115. Williams, 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135.
116. i d at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
117. Id at 408, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
118. Id. at 408-09, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
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article not actionable, noted that in California the common-law "fair
comment" privilege was codified in section 47(3).119 The court also de-
clared that the statute's application turns on the nature of the subject
matter of the defamatory report, not the plaintiff's status as a public or
private figure: "The crucial issue involved in determining the applicabil-
ity of the 'fair comment' privilege is whether or not the publication was
made in the public interest."12 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
article was privileged because the performance of a contractor hired by
the city was of sufficient public interest to trigger the statute's legal
protections. 121
The Williams opinion expressly rejected a narrow view of section
47(3)'s public interest privilege, holding that "the scope of the term 'pub-
lic interest' in California is not limited to matters relating solely to public
officials." '122 The court noted that the privilege had been applied to cases
where the subject matter was determined to be of public interest, in addi-
tion to those cases where the defamed individual was well-known among
a certain interest group.1 23 Given this specifically broad statement by the
Williams court concerning an article in a general circulation publication,
it is difficult to see how the court in Rancho La Costa could credibly
classify the Williams holding as being one concerning only a "local or a
special interest group and related to matters of special concern." 124
4. Balancing privacy interests
After offering supposedly supporting authority, and after attempting
to distinguish potentially contrary rulings, the Rancho La Costa court
turned to a consideration of privacy rights. The court concluded that
when the privacy interests of a private figure plaintiff clash with the free
speech concerns of a media defendant, privacy rights must prevail despite
the language of section 47(3):
Plaintiffs as private individuals are entitled to the protec-
119. Id. at 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
120. Id. at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
121. Id. In so finding, the court upheld the appropriateness of a jury instruction which read
in part:
The condition of streets, the use of them by taxpayers, and the inconvenience to
taxpayers caused by delay in repair or alteration of streets, are matters in which the
taxpayers of the City of Hayward were interested. Under these conditions, if the pub-
lication is not actuated by malice, it is privileged and, therefore, as such cannot
render the defendants liable for damages.
Id. at 415 n.8, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.8 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 417, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
123. Id.
124. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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tion of their right of privacy. That right is entitled to redress
when violated. Under the mandate of the recent federal
Supreme Court rulings, the right of privacy is paramount to the
right of free speech when in the exercise of free speech a de-
fendant violates another's privacy by uttering a defamatory lie
about him. The right of free speech guaranteed by the state and
federal constitutions does not permit violation of the right of
privacy. It most surely follows that the privilege created by
Civil Code section 47(3), a statute, and thus a law of lesser or-
ganic force, cannot be expanded to permit violation of that
same right of privacy. Whatever privilege is accorded defend-
ants under Civil Code section 47(3), it must yield to the plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights of privacy.
125
Thus, the Rancho La Costa opinion dealt proponents of section
47(3)'s public interest privilege a double blow: not only did the court
hold that the privilege did not extend to reports in general circulation
publications which address matters of public concern or interest, but the
court also found that the privilege could be overcome by the plaintiff's
showing of a strong privacy interest. 126
B. Pre-Rollenhagen Response to Rancho La Costa
Immediate judicial reaction to Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior
125. Id. The court did not specify which United States Supreme Court cases have held that
privacy rights were paramount to free speech rights.
126. Although this Comment is primarily concerned with the Rancho La Costa court's un-
satisfactory interpretation of § 47(3), the court's use of a privacy right analysis to counterbal-
ance a free speech-related statutory privilege is also disturbing. One veteran first amendment
litigator labeled the "explosion of privacy law" the "single most ominous threat to the First
Amendment's guarantee of press freedom .... ." F. ABRAMS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A
FREE SocIETY 49 (J. Bartlett ed. 1979). Essentially, the Rancho La Costa court may have
critically erred in concluding that privacy interests outweigh free speech concerns:
Freedom of speech and press protect the transfer of information to and from
every member of our society and shape society itself. Without the free exchange of
ideas and information, neither participatory democracy nor our culture could sur-
vive. Protection of personal reputation and privacy, on the other hand, although a
laudable libertarian goal, operates on a relatively isolated individual basis; very few
persons are ever harmed by inadvertent factual misstatements.... On balance, then,
the libertarian value of protecting individual reputations, especially in absence of tan-
gible pecuniary harm, should give way to the more important policy of ensuring free
expression.
Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV.
645, 654-55 (1977); see also A. SCHWARTZ, THE FIRST FREEDOM TODAY 283 (R. Downs &
R. McCoy ed. 1984) ("[D]espite the undeniable value our society places on the protection of
the individual for invasion of privacy and defamation, the First Amendment demands higher
priority on unfettered communication. Where the two are in conflict, the latter must
prevail.").
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Court12 7 was cautious and somewhat deferential. In Lagies v. Copley,12'
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, perhaps foreshadowing what was to
come in Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,129 continued to adhere to the
relatively broad fair comment/public interest interpretation of California
Civil Code section 47(3)."0o In Lagies, which was decided just four
months after Rancho La Costa, plaintiff M.J. Lagies brought a defama-
tion action against Helen Copley and others over an article published in
the California Journal.131 In the article, Copley suggested that Lagies, a
journalist, misstated facts in a news story Lagies authored. 132 The court
found Copley's statement concerning Lagies privileged under section
47(3) because Copley's views were "sought with respect to the 'liberal-
ized' editorial policies of the Copley Press, Inc."' 33 According to the
court, the article containing Copley's remarks "was, is, a matter ofpublic
interest to this community and the State of California .... ,,34 The Lagies
opinion made no mention of Rancho La Costa.
135
Conversely, Rancho La Costa weighed heavily on the collective
mind of the court that decided Institute of Athletic Motivation v. Univer-
sity of Illinois.1 36 This opinion, penned by the First District Court of
Appeal and handed down just a month before Rollenhagen, featured a
relatively thorough discussion of the protections afforded by section
47(3). The court held that a letter which discussed the reliability of a
psychological test for athletes and which was printed in a publication
127. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
128. 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980).
129. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
131. Lagies, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 963, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The California Journal is a
monthly public affairs periodical published in California.
132. Id. at 963-64, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
133. Id. at 967, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. The only authority relating to § 47(3) cited by the court was Emde v. San Joaquin
County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943). For a discussion of Emde,
see supra note 100. Two factors may explain the Lagies court's decision to ignore Rancho La
Costa. First, because the Rancho La Costa decision was handed down only a few months
before the Lagies ruling, the Lagies court may have already resolved the issue. Second, and
more importantly, appellate courts are not bound by the decisions of other appellate courts.
See infra note 189. The Lagies court, therefore, was not required by the doctrine of stare
decisis to reconcile its holding with the result in Rancho La Costa. Given that the Lagies court
analyzed the applicability of § 47(3) by focusing on the subject matter of the allegedly defama-
tory publication, rather than on the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure, the court
would have had a difficult time trying to reconcile its conclusion with Rancho La Costa even if
an attempt had been made. Conceptually, the two decisions are simply at odds with each
other.
136. 114 Cal. App. 3d 1, 170 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980).
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read by the users of such tests was privileged under the statute." 7
The allegedly defamatory letter, written by sports psychologist and
University of Illinois professor Rainer Martens, was critical of informa-
tion concerning athletes provided by the Institute of Athletic Motivation
(AI). 138 Ultimately, the letter was reprinted in Basketball Bulletin, a
periodical published by the National Basketball Coaches Association. 13 9
AMI brought a defamation suit against Martens and the University of
Illinois,1" and the defendants secured a general verdict at trial.
141
Upon AMI's appeal, the defendants successfully argued that the let-
ter was privileged under section 47(3) because all communications were
between interested parties: the letter concerned the reliability of sports
psychology tests and was addressed to the users and potential users of
such tests. 42 After reviewing a number of section 47(3) cases, 143 includ-
137. Id at 13, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
138. Martens' letter, which was sent to high schools, colleges and professional sports orga-
nizations throughout the country, charged that psychological tests of athletes conducted by the
Institute of Athletic Motivation (AMI) should not be given credence because they were based
on sparse documentation and were of suspect reliability. Id. at 4, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
139. IdL at 5, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
140. The university was joined in the action on a theory of respondeat superior. Id.
141. Id at 4, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
142. The court found that "Martens in his capacity as professor and student of sports psy-
chology was one who stood in such a relation to the persons interested as to afford reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent." Id. at 13, 170 Cal.
Rptr. at 418.
143. The following rulings were discussed or cited by the AMI court: Maidman v. Jewish
Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960) (editorial printed in
Anglo-Jewish newspaper criticizing a prominent member of the Southern California Jewish
community held privileged as a communication between interested parties), see supra text ac-
companying notes 97-100; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713
(1948) (publication in national Baptist newspaper detailing expulsion charges against church
members deemed privileged as a communication between interested parties), see supra text
accompanying notes 94-96; Emde, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (article in a labor journal
addressing labor policies of a local business held privileged as a communication between inter-
ested parties), see supra note 100; Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263 P. 812 (1928) (article
suggesting that mayor of Santa Cruz was subject of recall election because of mismanagement
and misappropriation of public funds held privileged because plaintiff was public officer), see
supra note 74; Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 216 P. 371 (1923) (court held § 47(3) confers no
privilege upon an article which suggested the plaintiff was of generally bad character), see
supra note 74; Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921) (cartoon por-
traying chief of police as dishonest public official held privileged because conduct of public
officers is of interest to every citizen they serve), see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text;
Lagies, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (journal article containing quote charging
that reporter misstated facts in newspaper article deemed privilege because issue was of public
concern and interest), see supra text accompanying notes 128-35; Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (article charging that plaintiffs had ties to organized crime not
privileged because § 47(3) does not protect reports on matters of public interest); Toney v.
State, 54 Cal. App. 3d 779, 126 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1976) (press release concerning suspension of
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ing Rancho La Costa, the court concluded that the privilege created by
the statute "is not capable of precise or categorical definition," and that
section 47(3)'s "application in a particular case depends upon an evalua-
tion of the competing interests which defamation law and the privilege
are designed to serve."'" The opinion recognized that there had been
both broad1"' and restrictive 146 interpretations of the statute. The court
attempted to finally articulate the scope of the section 47(3) privilege by
reasonably defining the concept of interested parties 47 and determined
that Martens' letter was privileged because the letter was in fact commu-
nicated between genuinely interested parties as defined by the AMI
college professor at public university held to be actionable because plaintiff's showing of mal-
ice overcame a § 47(3) privilege); Martin v. Kearney, 51 Cal. App. 3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1975) (letter from parents of student to school principal complaining about teacher's compe-
tence held privileged as a communication between interested persons); Katz v. Rosen, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 1032, 121 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975) (letter from doctor to local bar association detailing
allegedly unethical practices of attorney deemed privileged as a communication between inter-
ested parties); Deaile v. General Tel. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974)
(supervisor's report to company officials detailing poor attendance practices by employee held
privileged as a communication between interested parties); Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236
Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965) (report that contractor was behind schedule in
completing paving project deemed privileged because matter was of public concern), see supra
text accompanying notes 115-24; Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946)
(article reporting arrest of seven servicemen at alleged brothel held privileged because activities
of servicemen during times of war are of public interest), see supra text accompanying notes
106-14.
144. AMI, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
145. As examples, the court discussed Glenn and Williams and referred the reader to Toney
and Lagies. Id. at 9-10, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
146. The court discussed Rancho La Costa as the sole example. Id. at 10, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
416-17.
147. The court cited a number of authoritative definitions of what types of communications
are between interested parties. Id at 11, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 417. The court noted that the
Restatement of Torts suggests that a conditional privilege exists "if the circumstances lead any
one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or
reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest is
entitled to know." AMI, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (quoting REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977)). The court also quoted from a noted defamation
treatise:
The common interest [to be shared by the recipient] must be a legitimate interest, i.e.,
an interest which the law recognizes as worthy of protection and not an interest
which springs from and seeks to gratify idle curiosity alone. "The word 'interest' as
used in the cases, is not used in any technical sense. It is used in the broadest popular
sense, as when we say that a man is 'interested' in knowing a fact-not interested in it
as a matter of gossip or curiosity, but as a matter of substance apart from its mere
quality as news." "So long as the interest is of so tangible a nature that for the
common convenience and welfare of society, it is expedient to protect it, it will come
within the rule."
Id. at 11, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (quoting L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 87, at
841 (1978)).
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opinion. 148
The AMI court strove to reconcile its holding with Rancho La
Costa. First, the court noted that the publication was directed to a spe-
cific community, while the magazine article at issue in Rancho La Costa
was addressed to the public at large. Thus, the court could more easily
find that the communications were privileged because they were ex-
changed between obviously interested parties.149 Second, the court ar-
gued that the nature of the publication at issue in AMI gave the injured
parties greater opportunity to respond to the charges made against them
in the same or similar publications.1 50 That was not the case in Rancho
La Costa. Third, the court held that in Rancho La Costa privacy rights
helped play a role in outweighing any section 47(3) privilege, whereas in
the dispute presently before the court there were no compelling privacy
interests to balance against the recognition of a privilege.
1 51
It is unfortunate that the court in AMI did not have a broader fact
pattern to work with. Given that the justices' conclusions evolved from a
truly scholarly attempt to articulate the breadth of protection offered by
section 47(3), it would have been interesting to see how that court would
have handled a situation where the legal dispute involved a private per-
son/general circulation publication/public interest question. 152 How-
ever, thanks to the narrow facts before it, the AMI court had little
148. AMI, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
149. Id. at 12, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 418. Significantly, the AMI court did not suggest that a
general circulation publication could never benefit from the statute. However, if the opinion
meant to suggest that only publications directed to specific communities could be privileged
under § 47(3), the court's analysis would be flawed. To illustrate, the communication at issue
in AMI easily satisfied the interested party equation because the defamatory letter was au-
thored by a special party and published in a magazine directed at a special interest group. But
a communication published in a general circulation newspaper or magazine could still satisfy
the interested party equation as long as the author or publisher shared a common interest with
the readers of the publication. For example, aLosAngeles Times article discussing one author-
ity's dissatisfaction with the reliability of drug tests would be of interest to that newspaper's
readers because many of them are currently taking drug tests or may be subjected to drug
testing in the future.
150. Id. at 12-13, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
151. Id. at 13, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 418. See supra note 126 for a discussion of the dangers
presented by a judicial formulation which balances personal privacy rights against free speech
concerns.
152. By referring to the definitions of "interested parties" noted in the AMI opinion, it is
possible to speculate on how that court would have handled other fact patterns. The court
stated that if an interest is of "so tangible a nature that for the common convenience and
welfare of society, it is expedient to protect it, it will come within the rule" of privileged
communications between interested parties. AMI, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
417 (quoting L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 87, at 841 (1978)). Arguably, at
least, the Daily News article concerning Jerry Plotkin would fit within this definitional frame-
work. The interest to be protected by the article is the public's concern for law enforcement
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trouble ruling in favor of the defendants on section 47(3) grounds while
still remaining consistent with Rancho La Costa. Thus, the stage was set
for the court in Rollenhagen to finally confront the Rancho La Costa
decision head-on.
C. Rollenhagen: Reaffirmation of the Public Interest Privilege
In a defamation action exclusively controlled by federal constitu-
tional doctrine, the degree of fault the plaintiff must prove in order to
recover actual damages is a function of the plaintiff's status. If the plain-
tiff is a public official or public figure, the United States Constitution
requires that the plaintiff prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendant acted with constitutional actual malice."5 3 If the plaintiff
is a private figure, the Constitution only requires that the plaintiff show
that the defendant acted with some degree of fault.154 However, in a
defamation action also governed by state law which recognizes a public
interest privilege, the liability standard the plaintiff must successfully
plead is a function of the subject matter of the defamatory report, rather
than the plaintiff's notoriety. If the issue reported on is one of public
concern, then a liability standard more demanding than merely showing
fault will be imposed on the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is a private
figure in the most literal sense.
In Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court,55 the court declared
that in California the press does not enjoy a qualified privilege to report
on issues of public concern under California Civil Code section 47(3).156
Thus, under Rancho La Costa, if a plaintiff is a private figure but the
defamatory publication indisputably deals with an issue of public con-
cern, federal constitutional doctrine would control 57 and the plaintiff
would only have to prove ordinary negligence to recover actual damages.
and the right of citizens to know a fellow private citizen's reasons for being in a foreign coun-
try at a time of great instability and consequent risk to national security.
153. Constitutional actual malice is acting with knowledge of falsity of a statement or with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). For a discussion of New York Times and its progeny, see infra notes
224-38 and accompanying text.
154. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). However, to recover punitive
damages, the Gertz Court held that even a private figure plaintiff must prove that a media
defendant acted with constitutional actual malice. Id. at 349. For an extended analysis of the
holding in Gertz, see infra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
155. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 38-126 and accompanying text.
156. CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
157. This of course assumes that no other applicable state constitutional or statutory privi-
lege afforded the defendant protections which exceeded the federal constitutional floor.
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However, if that same fact pattern were controlled by the section 47(3)
interpretation set forth in Rollenhagen v. City of Orange,15 the defama-
tory publication would be deemed privileged under California law and
the plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant acted with malice. 159
These divergent analytical approaches highlight the most crucial differ-
ence between the rules of Rancho La Costa and Rollenhagen: under
Rancho La Costa, the court's initial inquiry will always focus on the pub-
lic/private status of the plaintiff while under Rollenhagen, the court's
initial inquiry will focus exclusively on the nature of the subject matter of
the allegedly defamatory publication.
To justify its markedly different interpretation of section 47(3), the
Rollenhagen court did not rely so much on precedential authority,
although plenty of supporting authority existed, but instead emphasized
the public policy benefits of a broader reading of the statute.
1. Background
Peter Rollenhagen owned an automobile repair business called Pe-
ter's Foreign Car Service.160 In 1973, Catherine and Elizabeth Mazur
brought their 1965 Volkswagon to Rollenhagen's shop for repairs. Rol-
lenhagen performed a number of service jobs on the car without com-
plaint. 161 Later that year, the Mazurs' car engine froze up on the
freeway, and Rollenhagen determined that the vehicle had literally run
out of oil; he told the Mazurs that he could repair the damage for about
$600.162 When Elizabeth came to pick up the car, Rollenhagen told her
that one of her headlights had been stolen and that he had replaced it.
He admonished her to report the theft to the City of Orange Police De-
partment and to file a report so that she could properly recover an insur-
ance claim to offset the cost of the repairs. 163 Elizabeth did go to the
police, who in turn told her that they had received some complaints and
heard a few "horror stories" about Rollenhagen's operation. 64 As a re-
sult of Elizabeth's visit, the police fied a comprehensive report of the
Mazurs' dealings with Rollenhagen and contacted the State Consumer
Affairs Department.1
65
158. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
159. To prove malice under California law, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
motivated by ill will. For the precise statutory definition, see supra note 28.
160. Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
161. Ia
162. Id at 418, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
163. Id at 418, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
164. Id
165. Id
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Shortly thereafter, the police, acting in concert with the Consumer
Affairs office, took a car to Rollenhagen's establishment, and Rol-
lenhagen diagnosed some problems and accordingly performed re-
pairs. 166 The car was actually in perfect working condition, but for an
inoperative spark plug.1 67 The local CBS-TV affiliate caught wind of the
story, and station reporters interviewed the Mazurs, Rollenhagen and the
police officers who investigated Rollenhagen's business. 168 After the sta-
tion broadcasted a report about Peter's Foreign Car Service, and detailed
the allegations against Rollenhagen, 169 Rollenhagen brought a defama-
tion action against CBS, Elizabeth Mazur and the City of Orange. 7 '
The trial court held that the broadcast was privileged under section
47(3), and the plaintiff appealed. 17  The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal, in pointed conceptual disagreement with Rancho La Costa,
affirmed.1
72
2. Analysis supporting a public interest interpretation
From the outset the Rollenhagen court adopted a pro-free speech
stance, initially noting that in the context of interpreting section 47(3),
"the California courts have recognized basic fair speech principles as par-
amount over plaintiffs whose status might be private or public, so long as
there was no malice, and the subject matter was one ofpublic interest.'
73
Rollenhagen's counsel argued that the United States Supreme
Court, through its most recent holdings, had enabled private figure plain-
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 419, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
169. Id. at 419, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
170. Id. at 416, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The City of Orange was dismissed as a defendant by
the trial court on a motion by the city for a judgment on the pleadings. Id.
171. Id. at 419-20, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
172. Id. at 429, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
173. Id. at 420, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (emphasis added). In support, the court cited four
cases: Brewer v. Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948) (publication in national
Baptist newspaper detailing expulsion charges against church members deemed privileged
under § 47(3) as a communication between interested parties); Snively v. Record Publishing
Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921) (cartoon portraying chief of police as dishonest public
official held privileged under § 47(3) because conduct of public officers is of interest to every
citizen they serve); Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946) (article report-
ing arrest of seven servicemen at alleged brothel held privileged under § 47(3) because activi-
ties of servicemen during times of war are of public interest); and Noral v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 P.2d 860 (1940). The courts in Snively, Glenn and Brewer
specifically applied § 47(3). In Noral, the court generally held that media reports commenting
on matters of public policy deserve special legal protection. Noral, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 104
P.2d at 863. For further discussion of Noral, see infra note 203.
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tiffs to more easily recover libel judgments against media defendants. 174
However, the Rollenhagen court noted that federal constitutional doc-
trine, as defined by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
71
allows the states to establish liability standards which are more protec-
tive of the press than the federal constitutional floor,17 6 and that Califor-
174. Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 420-22, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53. The plaintiff essen-
tially relied on Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, and its progeny's holdings that a private figure plaintiff
need only show negligence, not constitutional actual malice, even where the publication deals
with a matter of public interest. Id.
175. 418 U.S. 323.
176. Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53. In Gertz, the United
States Supreme Court stated: "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 418 U.S. at 347.
Since Gertz, many jurisdictions have taken advantage of the Gertz Court's invitation and have
adopted a public interest privilege within the confines of their own borders.
For example, in Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected Gertz's
simple negligence standard and held that Indiana state law recognizes a qualified privilege for
the press to report on matters of public concern. In an especially compelling opinion, the
court found that absent a public interest privilege, the goal of robust debate that was central to
the Supreme Court's holding in New York Times would be undermined. The court stated that
"factual error is inevitable in the course of free debate and ... some latitude for untrue or
misleading expression must be accorded to the communications media." Id. at 678, 321
N.E.2d at 586. Otherwise, the court ruled, "free, robust debate worthy of constitutional pro-
tection would be deterred and self-censorship would be imposed in the face of unpopular con-
troversy." Id.
Consequently, the court concluded that speech concerning public issues should be quali-
fiedly privileged regardless of the speaker's status:
The New York Times privilege standard was applied to defamatory falsehood con-
cerning a public official or public figure to give effect to the primary function of our
system of free expression-the encouragement of discussion and commentary on
public issues. The media was not accorded a special constitutional privilege merely
because society has a lesser interest in the protection and vindication of the reputa-
tions of public officials and public figures. The reputations of public figures and pub-
lie officials merit the same quantum of protection as those of private citizens.
Id. at 681, 321 N.E.2d at 587. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27 for a discussion of
New York Times.
Absent a qualified privilege, the Aafco Heating court continued, a mere negligence liability
standard would chill communication by imposing upon the press the "'untolerable [sic] bur-
den of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the
accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.'" 162 Ind. App. at 683, 321 N.E.2d
at 588 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), the Colorado
Supreme Court similarly ruled that a published defamatory remark concerning a private figure
is not actionable if "the matter involved is of public or general concern" unless the publisher
"knew the statement to be false or made the statement with reckless disregard for whether it
was true or not." Id. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457 (emphasis added). In Diversified Management,
Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1983), the Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed
its support for a public interest privilege:
[A] simple negligence rule would have a chilling effect on the press that would be
more harmful to the public interest than the possibility that a defamed private indi-
1590
June 1987] PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE 1591
nia had recognized a public interest privilege similar to that enunciated
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 17 through the adoption and subse-
quent interpretation of section 47(3).
17
1
The Rollenhagen court also noted that other jurisdictions have "ex-
pressed fear that a negligence standard in a public interest setting pro-
motes self-censorship and causes publishers to shun controversial
articles." 179 These jurisdictions-Indiana, Colorado, Virginia and New
York-today recognize, as a matter of state law, a broad public interest
privilege.' so The court stated:
While [these] states were apparently compelled to resort to
vidual would go uncompensated. In order to honor the commitment to robust de-
bate embodied in the first amendment and to ensure sufficient scope for first
amendment values, we [choose] to extend constitutional protection to any discussion
involving matters of public concern, irrespective of the notoriety or anonymity of those
involved.
Id. at 1106 (emphasis added).
New York also recognizes a public interest privilege. In Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-
Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975), the state's highest
court held that where the defamatory publication concerns a subject which is "arguably within
the sphere of legitimate public concern," a plaintiff can recover only if he can establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher "acted in a grossly irresponsible manner
without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordi-
narily followed by responsible parties." Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64
(emphasis added).
Alaska also protects speech concerning public issues. In Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12
(D. Alaska 1979), a federal district court concluded that the Alaska Supreme Court, if faced
with the issue today, would continue to recognize such a privilege despite the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz. Id. at 15-16. The district court ruled that long before
Gertz, Alaskan law had weighed the competing interests of safeguarding an individual's repu-
tation and allowing freedom of debate and expression on public issues and had "opted to
extend the privilege in favor of the public's interest in freedom of discussion on public issues."
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Although not mentioned by the Rollenhagen court, Michigan also recognizes a public
interest privilege. See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693
(1978) (qualified privilege to report on matters of public interest can only be overcome by
defendant's proving of actual malice); see also Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1113
(6th Cir. 1978) (applying Michigan law) ("As a story about a matter of public concern, the
article is protected under state law by the qualified privilege of 'fair comment' ").
For a thorough discussion of state court reactions to Gertz, see Cohen, Libel State Court
Approaches in Developing a Post-Gertz Standard of Liability, 1984 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 155
(1985).
177. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (private figure must show New York Times actual malice to recover
against a media defendant when the libelous communication addresses an issue of public or
general interest). For a more thorough discussion of Rosenbloom, see infra notes 231-38 and
accompanying text.
178. Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
179. Id. at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
180. Id. See supra note 176 for a discussion of the privilege recognized in these
jurisdictions.
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their courts to define a post-Gertz liability standard for private
individual plaintiffs, no such uncertainty exists in California.
The California standard is codified in [section 47(3)], as grant-
ing a qualified privilege to all publications which concern a mat-
ter of legitimate public interest. This standard of liability
predates Gertz by over 50 years and the only impact the Gertz
decision has on the standard is to decree it a constitutionally
acceptable one.
18 1
The court thus declared that the subject matter of a report, and not
an individual's notoriety, should be the cornerstone of analysis regarding
the appropriate standard of fault to be applied in defamation actions: "If
an individual becomes involved in a matter of public interest, whether he
is famous, infamous, or unknown, should be irrelevant; there is no cogent
reason to subject the press to a varying standard of liability because of the
subject's status."' 2 Accordingly, because the CBS broadcast was in the
public interest,'83 and because no evidence indicated that either CBS or
the Mazurs acted with malice,184 the court concluded that the conditions
for activating the section 47(3) privilege were satisfied. The court there-
fore held that the broadcast concerning Rollenhagen's business practices
was not actionable.
18 5
As a seemingly token act of deference to the holding in Rancho La
Costa, the Rollenhagen court made an effort, albeit a terse one, to recon-
cile the two decisions. First, the court stated that Rancho La Costa's
interpretation of what constitutes interested parties was "certainly broad
enough to encompass the case at bench, for the arena of auto repair has
been the subject of rather extensive legislative coverage in an attempt to
protect the public from fraudulent and dishonest practices."' 86 But upon
closer scrutiny, this attempt to fit the Rollenhagen holding within the
181. Rollenhagen, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (emphasis added).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. The court noted that "the arena of auto repair has been the subject of rather extensive
legislative coverage in an attempt to protect the public from fraudulent and dishonest prac-
tices." I at 426, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
184. The court pointed out that under § 47(3), the plaintiff must only show that the defend-
ant had a state of mind of ill will or hatred toward the plaintiff. Constitutional actual malice-
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth-is not required to negate the statutory privilege. Id. at 423, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 54. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's failure to thor-
oughly investigate its story constituted bad faith or malice under § 47(3). Id. Furthermore,
the court found that there was no evidence indicating that CBS had negligently prepared the
report concerning the plaintiff's business. Id. at 424, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
185. Id. at 427, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
186. Id. at 426, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
1592
PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
rule of Rancho La Costa is analytically difficult to accept: the Rancho La
Costa court emphatically rejected the notion that a generally circulated
publication could benefit from section 47(3) and distinguished every deci-
sion which had interpreted the statute as containing any general public
interest privilege component.
Second, the Rollenhagen court stated that it agreed with Rancho La
Costa's essential holding:
The rationale of [Rancho La Costa] appears to be that a pub-
lisher should not be able to define the scope of the privilege by
its own determination of what it chooses to publish and that the
court should consider the relationship between the publisher
and the reader and the legitimacy of the public interest in the
subject matter of the article. To this extent we agree.187
However, the two decisions took remarkably different (and mutu-
ally-exclusive) paths toward realizing this common ground. While the
rule of Rollenhagen focuses the legal discussion on the subject matter of a
libelous communication and the degree to which the communication in-
volves an issue of public concern, the rule of Rancho La Costa focuses on
the status of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a private figure, then under
Rancho La Costa the defendant cannot benefit from a section 47(3) privi-
lege unless, perhaps, the communication is printed in a special interest or
local publication and deals with an issue of special concern. 8'
While the Rollenhagen court should be commended for attempting
to reconcile its holding with Rancho La Costa,189 the consistencies be-
tween the two decisions are superficial at best. Thus, a genuine conflict
currently exists among California's appellate courts concerning the reach
of section 47(3). Now, in Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,19
the California Supreme Court must finally resolve the dispute. As the
following section points out, both stare decisis and public policy consid-
187. Id. at 427, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
188. In short, the rule of Rancho La Costa demands an extremely close nexus among the
communicator, the recipient and the subject matter. The rule of Rollenhagen, by contrast,
only requires some minimal connection among those three elements.
189. As a matter of law, this was unnecessary because courts of appeal are not bound by
each other's decisions; they are only bound by decisions of the California Supreme Court. See
Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1147,
209 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1985); see also 9 WrrKIN ON CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 772 (3d ed.
1985). At most, decisions of one district serve as persuasive authority and may provide gui-
dance in terms of the legal analysis applied. See Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1364 n.3
(9th Cir. 1981); McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1017,
140 Cal. Rptr. 168, 176 (1977).
190. No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986). For a discussion of the
controversy underlying Van Nuys Publishing, see supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
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erations favor the court's affirmation of Rollenhagen's interpretation of
section 47(3).
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
As the preceding analysis of the Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior
Court191 and Rollenhagen v. City of Orange192 decisions indicates, the
California Supreme Court, if it were to decide Van Nuys Publishing Co. v.
Superior Court 193 on purely stare decisis grounds, should clearly choose
to side with Rollenhagen. The Rancho La Costa ruling is logically and
foundationally flawed, and represents a lonely aberration in twentieth
century California Civil Code section 47(3)194 jurisprudence. However,
the supreme court will surely consider the policy ramifications of the two
rulings. Still, the court should reach the same result because the rule of
Rollenhagen is far more workable and desirable than the holding of
Rancho La Costa. A public interest privilege, where the standard of fault
is linked to the subject matter of the defamatory report, could be more
fairly and consistently applied than a rule which turns on the plaintiff's
status. A public interest privilege would also result in less complex litiga-
tion and would encourage the type of speech that legal scholars and con-
stitutional experts have repeatedly stated represents the core of the first
amendment.
A. Fairness of Application
The most immediate problem a lower court would have, if the
supreme court accepted Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court's9 ' in-
terpretation of California Civil Code section 47(3),196 would be trying to
apply the law in a fair and consistent manner. According to the reason-
ing of Rancho La Costa, "a defamatory article published at large to a vast
audience in a national magazine"'197 would not be privileged under sec-
tion 47(3) while publications limited to "a local or special interest group
191. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 38-126 and accompanying text.
192. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981). For a thorough analysis of Rol-
lenhagen, see supra notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
193. No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986). For a discussion of the
controversy underlying Van Nuys Publishing, see supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
195. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 3 8-126 and accompanying text.
196. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
197. Rancho La Costa, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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and related to matters of special concern"'198 would be privileged. As one
commentator has pointed out, this analytical approach is both vague and
unworkable: "[U]nder [Rancho] La Costa, it would be impossible to de-
termine whether an article in The New York Times (which has a substan-
tial national circulation in addition to its New York circulation) about a
countywide or statewide organization of the Boy Scouts of America
would be privileged under Section 47(3). ' ' 199 Consequently, if a newspa-
per editor could not reasonably assess the legal consequences of an arti-
cle, he might choose to "play it safe" and refuse to run a story altogether,
thus contributing to self-censorship of speech on public issues.
Moreover, the Rancho La Costa approach could be considered dis-
criminatory because large papers would rarely benefit from section 47(3),
while small or local publications might be able to routinely invoke the
statute's protections. Under Rancho La Costa, a small or local paper
would have little to fear from publishing an article concerning a local
individual. After all, the Rancho La Costa court did not challenge earlier
applications of section 47(3) where the publications were targeted at a
specialized or local audience. However, if the Los Angeles Times pub-
lished the same story, the Times might not benefit from the section 47(3)
privilege because the issue would not be of "local concern" to most of
that paper's readers.2 "o Furthermore, Rancho La Costa's distinction ig-
nores the fact that local issues and the acts of local citizens might be of
interest to all citizens. For example, a dispute in a small California town
198. Id. at 667, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
199. Heinke, Does Section 47(3) Protect the Press?, L. A. Daily J., Sept. 2, 1981, at 4, col. 6.
Conversely, one student commentator has concluded, after analyzing Rollenhagen in the con-
text of general California and federal constitutional defamation law, that "the public interest
privilege is too vague .... ." Comment, Private Plaintiffs and the Public Interest, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 985, 986 (1982). The author's primary concern is that recognition of such a privilege tips
the scales too far in the defendants' favor:
Because the existence of malice has been found so infrequently, and because the ex-
treme state of mind necessary to find an ill will is difficult to establish, it is evident
that malice based on ill will shall continue to be a largely unsuccessful device to
overcome the public interest privilege.
Id. at 1005. This is, of course, true, but the author's argument is hardly an indictment of the
public interest privilege. In fact, making recovery more difficult for private figure plaintiffs is
precisely the clear purpose of a public interest privilege. Just as the practically absolute public
official/public figure privilege recognized in New York Times and its progeny protects defama-
tory matter for public policy reasons, so too does a public interest privilege protect certain
publications that defame a private figure in the context of a discussion on an important public
matter. The solution to the problem identified in the student Comment is not a repudiation of
the privilege, but a privilege carefully defined so that only truly valuable types of speech are
protected. That way the best balance is achieved between the interests of society as a whole
and the interests of parties who have suffered reputational injury.
200. Heinke, supra note 199, at 4, col. 6.
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concerning toxic waste disposal may be of great interest to residents of
New Jersey, where toxic waste disposal problems also exist. Similarly,
the opposition of a small town to the nearby deployment of MX missiles
would be of great interest to citizens nationwide because the resolution of
the dispute may have an impact on this country's national security and
perhaps the international arms race.
The Rollenhagen approach would mitigate these problems by al-
lowing all types of publications to benefit from section 47(3) so long as
the article was of genuine interest to the publication's readers. Admit-
tedly, in the case of large general circulation publications the defendant
may have a more difficult time establishing that a given article is of inter-
est to some of the publication's readers, but the privilege would still be an
available and attractive legal shield. Under Rancho La Costa, a truly
mass media outlet could rarely, if ever, successfully raise a section 47(3)
defense.
B. Judicial Efficiency
California Supreme Court endorsement of Rancho La Costa, Inc. v.
Superior Court's20 1 interpretation of California Civil Code section
47(3)202 could also lead to hopelessly confusing litigation.2 03 Federal
201. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 38-126 and accompanying text.
202. CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
203. One student commentator contends that the Rollenhagen approach would serve to
"further confuse" defamation law by exacerbating problems associated with variable liability
standards. Comment, supra note 8, at 193. The commentator states that the difficulty of prov-
ing statutory malice in California could provoke an "anomalous result" whereby "the media
would receive greater protection under California's new fair comment privilege than under the
federal constitutional privilege and, correspondingly, private individuals would be less pro-
tected by their own state law than by a [federal] constitutional privilege ostensibly designed to
protect the press." Id. at 194. This argument, of course, assumes that state law should be no
more protective than federal law. In California, at least, that is certainly not the case. The
California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state constitutional free speech guarantees
are more expansive than federal constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) ("[s]pecial protections thus accorded speech are marked in this court's
opinions"); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472 (1975) ("[a] protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amend-
ment is contained in our state constitutional guarantee of the right of free speech and press").
Also, California's courts have appreciated, even outside the § 47(3) context, the virtues of
speech that address matters of public concern. For example, in Noral v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 P.2d 860 (1940), the court explained why discussions concern-
ing issues of public interest deserve added protection:
Charges of libel against a publication which has reported or commented upon
matters involving public policy should be viewed with caution. It is in such matters
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constitutional protections for the press in defamation actions, as defined
by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,"° Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 °5 and Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.2°6 are a function of the plaintiff's status. For a public official or
public figure, a showing of constitutional actual malice is required; if the
plaintiff is a private figure, all he need show is ordinary negligence. Thus,
in any defamation action, the court must first determine the plaintiff's
status before the requisite elements of recovery can be established. This
is no simple task.
For example, to be considered a "public official," a plaintiff must
have "substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of gov-
that the freedom of the press is of paramount concern. Without such freedom, the
march of progress might be stayed or the venom of alien cultures might stealthily
undermine cherished landmarks. "It is far better for the public welfare that some
occasional consequential injury to an individual, arising from general censure of his
profession, his party, or his sect, should go without remedy, than that free discussion
on the great questions of politics, or morals, or faith should be checked by the dread
of embittered and boundless litigation."
Id. at 353, 104 P.2d at 863 (citation omitted).
The Comment author also argues that under Rollenhagen's public interest interpretation,
private figure plaintiffs would be unduly burdened by having to meet evidentiary burdens al-
most as great as those imposed on public officials and public figures. See, Comment, supra
note 8, at 94. This, the Comment author contends, would compromise the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz that private figures are more vulnerable to reputational in-
jury and should thus have better prospects of recovery vis-a-vis public officials and public
figures. Id. While this contention has merit, it is flawed in two respects.
First, the Gertz court did not declare that, as a matter of public policy, private figure
defamation plaintiffs should always benefit from a lesser liability standard. To the contrary,
the Court only held that under the United States Constitution a plaintiff of any status must
show, as a minimum, some degree of fault, and invited the states to define more rigorous
liability standards if they so desired. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
Second, the author's contention fails to consider the public policy benefits that would
accrue from a public interest privilege. The very purpose of any privilege is to protect speech
which boasts benefits, in terms of the value of the information communicated, that outweigh
its potential defamatory effects. This analysis may seem unduly harsh to the private figure who
is defamed, but, according to the United States Supreme Court, that is a risk all citizens in an
open democracy are obligated to take:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression
or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One
need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of pub-
lished matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public
officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a
society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (emphasis added).
204. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
205. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
206. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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ernmental affairs." '2 07 Thus, a court would have to examine the duties
the plaintiff performed in every public office he has ever held before mak-
ing a proper determination of the plaintiff's status.
The process can be even more complicated if the media claims that
the plaintiff is a "public figure." The United States Supreme Court has
identified several different types of public figures. "General public
figures" are individuals which "occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all pur-
poses."2 ° "Limited public figures," on the other hand, "have thrust
themselves to the forefront" of only "particular public controversies. 20 9
Obviously, precise determination of a plaintiff's status as a "public fig-
ure" could involve lengthy and exhaustive discovery and other legal
proceedings.21°
These complications are exacerbated if there are multiple plaintiffs,
and the plaintiffs do not all share the same status. For example, in a case
where one publication allegedly defamed both a public figure plaintiff
and a private figure plaintiff, the private figure would only need to show
negligence while the other plaintiff would have to show actual malice.
Also, plaintiffs in the same suit may have different burdens of proof.
2 11
Application of these differing standards has often resulted in seemingly
incongruous results.212 This potential for confusion and inconsistent rul-
207. Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 21, 142 Cal. Rptr.
689, 692 (1977) (emphasis and citation omitted).
208. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
209. Id. Limited public figures are further classified as being either voluntary, in the sense
that the individual purposefully thrusted himself into the public limelight, or involuntary in
that they become involved "through no purposeful action of [their] own." Id.
210. Ironically, the Plotkin case itself required nearly a two-week mini-trial to determine
the plaintiff's status. The mini-trial judge concluded that Plotkin was a private figure for all
purposes. See Memorandum of Decision at 1-2 & 4-5, Plotkin v. Van Nuys Publishing Co.,
No. C 359 227 (L.A. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1986). For a discussion of Plotkin, see supra notes 14-
37 and accompanying text.
211. A public figure or public official plaintiff must show actual malice by clear and con-
vincing evidence. See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). A private figure plaintiff may only have to show
ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal.
App. 3d 926, 931-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (1975).
212. For example, compare Rancho La Costa (organized crime member not a public figure)
with Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978) (organized crime member is a public figure); Vegod Corp. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 886 (1980) (plaintiff who advertised for and conducted a "close-out" sale for a landmark
department store is not public figure) with Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264,
273-74 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff who advertised and sold discount steaks is a public figure); and,
Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131
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ings213 may chill a publisher who cannot, even with the assistance of the
most expert counsel, determine the potential legal consequences of run-
ning a news story by examining prior case law.
A public interest privilege would end this legal malaise. By focusing
on the content of the speech, rather than the status of the plaintiff, no
extended discovery proceedings concerning the plaintiff's background
would be necessary until the court first determined that section 47(3) did
not render the publication privileged.2 14 Moreover, the courts would not
be influenced by the inherently unique facts concerning the status of the
individual parties to the actions, and could develop consistent standards
for determining what types of published material fall within and outside
the zone of public interest privilege protection.215
C. Encouragement of Robust Debate on Public Issues
While problems of application might plague the courts in the short
term, the long-term disadvantages of a Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior
Court21 6 approach would prove to be even more serious. Simply put,
adoption of the Rollenhagen v. City of Orange2 17 court's interpretation of
California Civil Code section 47(3)218 would be far more consistent with
the values of free speech that our founding fathers, and the California
courts, have recognized as crucial to the successful functioning of our
representative democracy.
(1979) (teacher not a public figure) with Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93,
321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974) (teacher is a public figure).
213. One author has noted that "[d]istinguishing private from public persons has not
yielded predictable results. As one beleaguered trial judge complained, '[d]efining public
figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." Comment, Defamation and the First
Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 75, 95-96 (1980) (quoting
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440,443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1978)).
214. The applicability of § 47(3), of course, could be clarified at an early stage of litigation
by the filing of a demurrer or a motion for summary judgment on § 47(3) grounds.
215. A public interest privilege has been successfully applied in other jurisdictions, see
supra note 176, and in other areas of the law. For example, in invasion of privacy suits the
subject matter may be privileged if the court finds that it was newsworthy. See, e.g., Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (court held that actual malice standard applies to false
light cases involving publications relating to public interest); RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 652D (1977) (plaintiff must show that articles are "not of legitimate concern to the
public").
216. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 3 8-126 and accompanying text.
217. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981). For a thorough analysis of Rol-
lenhagen, see supra notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
218. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
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Throughout our history, the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the importance of protecting speech that involved matters of
public interest or concern. For example, in Grosjean v. American
Press,219 where the Court struck down a discriminatory tax on large
newspapers, the majority opinion forcefully stated that newspapers must
be allowed to perform their crucial role of informing the public:
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country
... have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public
and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumental-
ity of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be
regarded otherwise than with grave concern.220
Similarly, in Thornhill v. Alabama,22 1 where a state law which pro-
hibited loitering or picketing near business establishments was invali-
dated, the Court stressed the value of a free flow of information
concerning public issues. Justice Murphy, writing for the majority,
stated that the ability of citizens to "speak as they think on matters vital
to them" was "essential to free government.12 22 He concluded: "Free-
dom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period.
'223
In 1964, the Supreme Court issued perhaps its strongest statement
yet concerning the unique importance of free speech in America. In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,224 the Court, for the first time, reversed a
state libel judgment on federal constitutional grounds. The Court de-
clared that there was a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ' 225 To facil-
itate such robust debate, the Court ruled that a public official could not
recover damages in a libel action unless he showed the report was false
and that the defendant acted with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
219. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
220. Id. at 250.
221. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
222. Id. at 95.
223. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
224. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
225. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
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not." 6 To justify its decision, the Court stressed the core values of the
first amendment:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we
have said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people." "The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be re-
sponsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security
of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.
227
Not long after the historic holding in New York Times, however,
cases arose where information of vital interest to the public was not ut-
tered by or did not concern a public official. Hence, the Supreme Court,
in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 8 and Associ-
ated Press v. Walker,229 extended federal constitutional protection to
statements made about public figures. Chief Justice Warren's concur-
rence explained the Court's rationale:
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between govern-
mental and private sectors are blurred.... In many situations,
policy determinations which traditionally were channelled
through formal political institutions are now originated and im-
plemented through a complex array of boards, committees,
commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely
connected with the Government. This blending of positions
and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that
many who do not hold public office at the moment are neverthe-
less intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions....
... Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest
in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to
engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public
issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public
officials."
2z30
226. Id. at 279-80.
227. Id. at 269 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
228. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan's plurality
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The next logical step was to apply the New York Times actual mal-
ice standard to private figures, but only when they spoke on matters of
public interest. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.231 the Court did just
that. Rosenbloom represented the third consecutive major legal victory
for the media, but the triumph would prove to be short-lived. In Rosen-
bloom, the Court held that the press enjoyed a federal constitutional priv-
ilege to non-maliciously report allegedly defamatory information about
public or private figures if the information addressed matters of "public
or general interest." '232
Justice Brennan, who authored the Court's plurality opinion, ex-
plained that private figures, as well as public figures, are often involved in
activities which greatly influence the lives of all Americans:
Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more
than knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities
of various levels of government. The commitment of the coun-
try to the institution of private property, protected by the Due
Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the Constitution,
places in private hands vast areas of economic and social power
that vitally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation.
Our efforts to live and work together in a free society not com-
pletely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily en-
compasses far more than politics in a narrow sense.233
Justice Brennan further noted that the public's interest in many top-
ics is a function of the subject matter, not the individuals involved:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it can-
not suddenly become less so merely because a private individual
is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
"voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the con-
opinion also discussed the importance of a privilege to speak on matters of public concern:
"The dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of public interest is for us, in the
historic words of the Declaration of Independence, 'an unalienable right' that 'governments
are instituted among men to secure.'" Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
231. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
232. Id. at 44.
233. Id. at 41. To further support this point, Justice Brennan cited an often-used quote
from Thornhill v. Alabama: "'Freedom of discussion, if it would fullill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to en-
able the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'" Id. (quoting Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
1602
PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
duct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.234
Justice Brennan added that "the First Amendment's impact upon state
libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public offi-
cial,' 'public figure,' or 'private individual,' as it derives from the question
whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public
or general interest.' '2 35 Accordingly, he found that it made perfect ana-
lytical sense for the Court to extend the New York Times actual malice
rule to press reports concerning matters of public interest.236
Absent a federal constitutional public interest privilege, Justice
Brennan believed the media would be intimidated. He feared that a "rea-
sonable care" standard would place on the press the" 'intolerable burden
of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by
it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.'
Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus cre-
ate the danger that the legitimate utterance will be deterred." '237
In the view of one commentator, the Rosenbloom decision ushered
in a new era of healthy media conduct, a period when the press most
effectively performed the government watchdog role envisioned by the
founding fathers:
From Times v. Sullivan to Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, a
period of seven years, a Supreme Court influenced by Justices
Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan expanded First Amend-
ment protection for news reporters in a fashion consistent with
the public's ever-growing need to know, and consistent also
with the basic tenets of the First Amendment. The result was a
climate of journalistic criticism and investigation which pro-
duced the revelations of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate.
It was a time in which the press-and other media-finally
came into its own, stubbing toes, barging in where it wasn't
wanted, sometimes being vulgar, sometimes being wrong, but
uncovering the essential insight, the unmentionable question,
the buried fact, which allowed American society to see what its
government was actually doing.
2 38
Yet only three years after Rosenbloom the Court reversed itself and
held that the public interest doctrine should not be an element of federal
234. Id. at 43.
235. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 44-45.
237. Id. at 50 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
238. A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 126, at 283.
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constitutional law. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,239 in a marked analyt-
ical departure from the immediately preceding cases, 2' the Court held
that private figures only need to show that a media defendant acted with
some degree of fault to recover actual damages,241 even if the publication
involves a matter of public interest. The Court noted the importance of
protecting the reputations of individuals who do not have access to the
mass media to answer the charges made against them,242 and discussed
the difficulties the legal system may face in enforcing and uniformly ap-
plying the Rosenbloom standard:
[The Rosenbloom holding] would occasion the additional diffi-
culty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoe
basis which publications address issues of "general or public
interest" and which do not-to determine... "what informa-
tion is relevant to self-government." We doubt the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience of judges.243
Unfortunately, the Gertz Court's distinction between public and pri-
vate figures has led to more confusion than a public interest privilege ever
could24 and has been severely criticized by numerous commentators be-
cause the distinction makes little analytical sense.24 For example, under
the Gertz formulation, speech concerning a private figure's involvement
with an issue of definite public interest-speech that is undoubtedly at
the so-called "core" of the first amendment-is not protected by the New
York Times actual malice rule, while speech discussing the unruly behav-
239. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
240. Prior to Gertz, the focus of the Court's analysis was clearly on the subject matter of the
speech, not the status of the communicator: "It was free expression that the Court said was
protected, not free expression about particular sorts of potential plaintiffs. It was free debate
on matters of public interest that the Court said was guaranteed, not debate free only from
lawsuits brought by 'public' plaintiffs," R. SACK, supra note 1, at 17.
241. However, the Gertz Court also held that to recover punitive or presumed damages
against a media defendant, a private figure plaintiff must still prove constitutional actual mal-
ice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. For a definition of constitutional actual malice, see supra note 25.
242. Id. at 344.
243. Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
244. See supra note 212 for a discussion of the inconsistent results produced by applications
of the Gertz rules.
245. See Ashdown, supra note 126, at 662 ("That the individual participating in a public
event is a 'private' person does not diminish either the public's interest in being informed or the
media's interest in reporting"); Comment, Further Limits on Libel Actions-Extension of the
New York Times Rule to Libels Arising from Discussion of "Public Issues," 16 VILL. L. REV.
955, 981 (1971) ("If the application of the first amendment to the press is to assure the circula-
tion of ideas, there seems to be no valid reason why constitutional protection should depend on
the party discussed rather than the idea that is circulated.").
1604
PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE
ior of a movie star in a public place is protected.246 Thus, the Gertz ap-
proach is at odds with the fundamental purpose of New York Times:
In discarding Rosenbloom's "public or general concern"
test, Gertz restricts the Times doctrine's influence, confining its
operation to "public plaintiff" cases. It thus undermines what
had emerged as the dominant rationale for the constitutional
privilege to defame-the conviction that the privilege is neces-
sary to protect and encourage uninhibited debate on matters of
public concern-and signals a return to a more restricted view
of the purposes of the first amendment .... 247
The Gertz decision is also counterproductive from a public policy
perspective because the holding encourages media organizations to only
investigate those parties who would definitely satisfy the public figure/
public official test, thus leaving private figures who nonetheless exert
great control over society free from serious press scrutiny.248 Gertz also
contributes to media self-censorship by making libel litigation more at-
tractive to a defamed individual, of any status.249
While the California Supreme Court cannot overrule Gertz as a con-
trolling decision in the area of federal constitutional law, the court can
nevertheless mitigate the harshness of the decision's application in Cali-
fornia by ratifying Rollenhagen and recognizing within the scope of sec-
tion 47(3) a public interest privilege similar to the one articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom. With a public interest
privilege in place, the focus in California would properly be on the sub-
ject matter of the defamatory material, rather than on the status of the
defamed party. This would bring California law more in line with the
true spirit of first amendment values:
246. See Branson & Sprague, The Public Figure-Private Person Dichotomy: A Flight From
First Amendment Reality, 90 DICK. L. Rnv. 627, 634-37 (1986).
247. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. Rnv. 422, 445 (1975) (footnote
omitted).
248. Id. at 480.
249. Id. at 452. Anderson argued that Gertz would increase the prospects for litigation in
two ways: First, it encourages litigation by actually enhancing the prospects of recovery for
private plaintiffs by reducing the fault standard from New York Times actual malice to simple
negligence; second, Gertz encourages more plaintiffs to bring suit by positively affecting the
plaintiffs' perceptions, valid or not, of the prospects for ultimate recovery. Id
Some believe the Gertz decision has actually contributed to an increase in libel litigation.
See Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 937, 937-38 (1984) ("If libel law was dead following New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and its progeny, it certainly has enjoyed a resurrection in the wake of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Ina "); Smith, The Rising Tide of Libel Litigation: Implications of the Gertz Negligence
Rule, 44 MONT. L. Rnv. 71 (1983) (author discusses recent upsurge in defamation suits and
associates the rise with the relaxed recovery standards enunciated in Gertz).
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Regardless of one's taste for the breadth of the actual hold-
ing in Rosenbloom, its subject matter perspective retains consti-
tutional consistency and integrity. Even with the scope of the
subject matter inquiry restricted to matters that directly affect
self-government, it is essentially a one-issue approach in-
dependent of fastidious categorization based on the status of
the potential libel plaintiff. If an article or story involves public
policy or the ftmctioning of government, it should be protected
by the New York Times actual malice standard. Although reso-
lution of this issue will not always be clear, this standard of
analysis gives the media the greatest protection in precisely those
cases that lie at the philosophical heart offreedom of the press.
A publisher would be free to release a story about matters of
public concern without fear of vindictive or vexatious retalia-
tion by a plaintiff whose status is uncertain.25 °
The United States Supreme Court would have no quarrel with the
formal adoption of the Rosenbloom public interest privilege doctrine in
California. Despite the Gertz language rejecting a federal constitutional
public interest privilege, the Court did not completely discount its merits;
instead, the Court only held that the federal Constitution does not re-
quire such a privilege. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Powell,
invited state courts to establish their own levels of protection as long as
they do not impose liability without fault.2s1 Hence, under Gertz, a state
can adopt the Rosenbloom doctrine as its own state constitutional or stat-
utory standard. To date, a number of states have done precisely that.252
Furthermore, since Gertz, the Court has repeatedly stressed how im-
portant the dissemination of information concerning public issues is to
the successful functioning of our free society. For example, in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,2 3 Justice Powell's majority opinion re-
marked that " '[f]reedom of discussion.., must embrace all issues about
250. Ashdown, supra note 249, at 951-53 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). For addi-
tional discussion in support of a public interest privilege, see Christie, Underlying Contradic-
tions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DUKE L. REv. 811, 821 ("My
own personal preference... increasingly grows in favor of applying the Sullivan standard to
all defamation actions. This standard provides maximum protection for freedom of discussion
and preserves the plaintiff's right to redress when the defendant's conduct is particularly repre-
hensible."); Comment, supra note 215, at 75 ("Speech on public issues, being necessary for a
self-governing democracy, is at the core of the first amendment. When such speech is at issue,
the Court should not balance the value of speech against competing social values.").
251. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
252. See supra note 176.
253. 435 U.S. 765 (1977) (spending limits imposed only on corporations in referendum
campaigns held unconstitutional as an impermissible restriction on freedom of speech).
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which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' "24 And in the more
recent case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,255 Jus-
tice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, opined that:
We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance. It is speech on "'matters of public
concern' "that is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion." As we stated in Connick v. Myers, this "special concern
[for speech on public issues] is no mystery":
"The First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.' '[S]peech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.' Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed
that speech on public issues occupies the '"highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,"' and is entitled to spe-
cial protection.1
2 56
Hence, while the Court may have determined that not all speech
related to matters of public concern could be explicitly protected under
the federal Constitution, the Court nevertheless left that option open to
the states and has since strongly hinted, through its language in cases
such as Belotti and Dun & Bradstreet, that it would approve of protec-
tions at the state level like those recognized in Rosenbloom.
Some argue that recognition of a public interest privilege would be
redundant in light of federal constitutional and/or state constitutional
standards; that such a privilege would render meaningless the Supreme
Court's public official/private figure distinction; and that a public inter-
est privilege would obscure the justification in Gertz that private figure
plaintiffs are more deserving of reputational protection than public
figures.257 However, these concerns are easily dispelled.
In no way would a qualified section 47(3) public interest privilege
render current federal constitutional protections meaningless. Instead, a
statutory privilege would provide a valuable mid-level source of protec-
tion and thereby effectively balance the interests of private figure plain-
.254. Id. at 776 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)) (emphasis
added).'
255. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (to collect presumed and punitive damages in a defamation action,
a private figure plaintiff is not required to prove a non-media defendant acted with actual
malice where the communication does not concern a matter of public interest).
256. Id. at 758-59 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (citations and
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
257. See Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 14, at 4648.
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tiffs and society. The press would benefit because plaintiffs, in order to
recover actual damages, would have to show more than simple negli-
gence. Additionally, the private figure plaintiff would not be as burdened
as the public official or public figure plaintiff because he or she would
only need to show statutory malice, rather than constitutional actual
malice, to overcome any privileges.25 8 Thus, a three-tier scheme of pro-
tection would be in force: if the article concerned a public official or
public figure, the plaintiff would have to prove constitutional actual mal-
ice to recover actual damages; if the article involved a private figure and
a matter of public interest, then the plaintiff would have to prove statu-
tory malice as defined by California law to recover; finally, if the article
involved a private figure and addressed an issue of private or limited con-
cern, the plaintiff would only have to show ordinary negligence to
recover.
V. A PROPOSAL
In Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,25 9 the California
Supreme Court should hold as a matter of law that California Civil Code
section 47(3)260 confers upon the press a qualified privilege to report on
matters of public concern or interest. This privilege should be disquali-
fied only by a showing of malice, as defined by the California Civil
Code.261 The court could define the precise scope of the privilege either
broadly or narrowly.262
Should the court choose a broad definition of matters of public con-
cern or interest, as the United States Supreme Court did in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc.,263 the extent of the privilege may be ambiguous at
258. Constitutional actual malice, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, requires
that the plaintiff show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 280. Actual malice, under California law, only requires a showing by the plaintiff that the
defendant's publication was false and motivated by ill will or evil motive. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 48a(4)(d) (West 1982).
259. No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986). For a discussion of the
controversy underlying Van Nuys Publishing, see supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
260. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1987). See supra text accompanying
note 5 for the text of § 47(3).
261. See supra note 28 for the California definition of malice.
262. Either way, the privilege would still have to be consistent with the actual text of
§ 47(3). For example, the court would have to be able to conclude, in applying the privilege,
that the article in question was of legitimate interest to some of the publication's readers, or
that the nature of the publication was such that there was reason to believe that the publisher's
motives were innocent, or that the readers of the publication in some way requested the
information.
263. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Rosenbloom Court refused
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first. Undoubtedly, the courts would initially have to determine the stat-
ute's application on a case-by-case basis, and as a consequence of the
resulting uncertainty, the press may hesitate to initially rely on the privi-
lege.2 However, our judiciary is eminently capable of tackling such a
challenge,2 6' and in time the full confidence of the media would be re-
stored and the press could return to effectively fulfilling its critical role as
society's watchdog. While libel litigation would still be a concern, the
plaintiff's prospects for success where the allegedly defamatory publica-
tion addressed a public issue would certainly be reduced.
While some critics may view a broadly interpreted public interest
privilege as dangerously over-inclusive, the privilege would at least insure
that all forms of truly important speech, regardless of the status of the
actors involved, are accorded higher degrees of protection than is cur-
rently available under the United States Constitution,26 6 as interpreted
under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
267
Alternatively, the California Supreme Court could choose to more
narrowly define an issue of public concern as one involving matters rele-
vant to the concept of self-government. Proponents of this model argue
that the public interest privilege should at the very least shelter "stories
that facilitate public discussion on matters important to the governance
to specifically define what topics constitute issues of public or general concern. The Court
stated that it would leave "the delineation of the reach of that term to future cases." Id. at 44-
45. However, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion broadly stated that citizens should have ac-
cess to all information which is "'needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period."' Id. at 41 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102 (1940)).
264. Not all journalists would be concerned about this uncertainty. Currently, many re-
porters are willing to take legal risks for the sake of a "good story." If a public interest privi-
lege is recognized--even a vague one-present risks will be reduced and the assertive reporter
will feel even more license to aggressively investigate public issues.
265. As one commentator explained:
[U]nder the rubric of the "political and social change" sought to be encouraged
by the first amendment, the courts could develop standards for the proper applica-
tion. Courts are much better qualified to apply a legal principle such as [a public
interest privilege] than juries are to apply [under Gertz] the general concept of negli-
gence to the field of journalism, in which few, if any, generally recognized standards
of practice exist.
Smith, supra note 249, at 90 (footnote omitted).
266. As one author observed:
Even if one does not subscribe to the Rosenbloom theory of the first amendment
that the guarantees of speech and press extend not only to comments about public
officials, public affairs, and public personalities, but to all relevant information neces-
sary to enable a person to cope with a complex society, the public interest standard
nevertheless provides insulation for the unfettered discussion of public policy and
governmental operations, which are at the core of free expression.
Ashdown, supra note 249, at 955 n.97 (citation omitted).
267. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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of the nation. Its purpose should be to protect the function of the 'citi-
zen-critic of government.' ,268 In application, this type of privilege
might work this way:
If a private individual is involved in a matter related to a gov-
ermnental function, he or she would be subject to the privilege.
Conversely, the privilege would not apply to stories about the
purely private lives of entertainers such as Carol Burnett or
Johnny Carson. Of course, the public or private status of an
individual will frequently affect the determination of whether
the privilege applies. For example, a report of a private individ-
ual's divorce and financial crisis would not be privileged. How-
ever, if the very same story is written to prove a candidate's
unfitness for public office, it would be related to the candidate's
participation in government and would, therefore, be subject to
the privilege.
2 69
The primary benefit of this narrower view of the public interest privilege
would be its greater predictability.
270
While a broadly applied privilege would be more protective of free
speech values, a narrow approach would still be far preferable to the re-
pudiation of any privilege at all. As long as the court recognizes some
kind of significant public interest privilege component under section
47(3), the focus of the court's inquiry will initially focus on the subject
matter of the publication. This way truly critical forms of discussion will
receive heightened judicial protection, whether the speech concerns a
public or private figure.
Once the California Supreme Court declares that section 47(3) does
render privileged mass media reports that concern matters of legitimate
public interest, the court could dispose of the Jerry Plotkin controversy
in one of'two ways.271 First, the court could remand the case to Los
Angeles Superior Court, where Judge Markey could reconsider his mini-
trial ruling272 in light of the court's fresh interpretation of the statute. Or
268. Branson & Sprague, supra note 246, at 637-38 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at
282).
269. Id. at 638 (footnotes omitted).
270. Comment, supra note 213, at 95 ("If the public issue standard limited absolute protec-
tion to core speech, that is, speech necessary for self-government, lower courts would have
sufficient guidance so that unpredictability could be minimized.").
271. The Van Nuys Publishing case is significant primarily because the suit is forcing the
California Supreme Court to finally resolve the § 47(3) issue; the court's specific finding re-
garding the Plotkin article is of secondary importance in terms of the issues addressed in this
Comment.
272. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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second, the supreme court could go a step further and apply its new rule
to the facts of the case, and find the Daily News article privileged under
section 47(3).273 Either way, the confusion that has pervaded the Cali-
fornia courts for almost 100 years concerning the scope of section 47(3)
will finally be put to rest.
273. For several reasons, the publication of the article about Jerry Plotkin clearly concerned
a matter of legitimate public interest. First, uncontested evidence indicating the public had a
tremendous interest in the Iranian hostages was presented by the defendants at a special mini-
trial held for the purpose of determining the standard of fault the plaintiff was required to
prove. Professor Marvin Zonis, a public opinion expert, testified that polls showed that an
amazing 99% of the American public were aware of the taking of the hostages, and were
unusually angry about the crisis. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities
at 8, Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing
granted June 26, 1986). Furthermore, Zonis told the court that certain communities tended to
identify with and express special concern for hostages who were from those communities. Id.
And the public wanted to know about the backgrounds of the individual hostages. According
to one expert witness at the mini-trial, there was "a blossoming across the country of profiles
and stories published in newspapers locally .... " Id. Additionally, the general public was
especially interested in Jerry Plotkin because he was the only hostage who was not an em-
ployee of the United States government. Id. at 8-9.
Second, the editors of the Daily News had good reason to believe that publication of the
article would be in the public interest and for the public's benefit. Unquestionably, the article
discussed material which was directly related to a major international political crisis. As an
American held hostage by Iranian terrorists, Plotkin was thrust into the thick of one of the
most significant news events of the 1970's. Because Plotkin was the only private citizen kid-
napped, the American people had a legitimate reason to be interested in his justifications for
being in Iran. Not only was Iran particularly unfriendly to the United States at the time the
terrorists stormed the embassy, but the Middle East in general was then infamous for its inter-
nal political turmoil and consequent risk to foreign travelers.
Moreover, as a hostage in Iran, Plotkin was at the mercy of the negotiating prowess and
international clout of the United States government. Accordingly, his reasons for being in Iran
at the time the embassy was stormed would be of legitimate interest to the general public
because the substance of those reasons might influence the degree of public support for various
negotiating postures taken on his behalf. Perhaps some citizen-critics of our government
would not support the use of military force, or any other.form of government influence, to
secure the release of a person who was kidnapped while allegedly attempting to consummate
an illegal narcotics transaction.
Publication of the article could also be considered to be in the public interest because
information in the article might have helped contribute to an understanding of Plotkin's highily
visible conduct both during his captivity and after his release. Also, information in the article
might have helped the public more honestly react to Plotkin upon his return to the United
States. Because of the questions raised by the article, citizens might not feel comfortable treat-
ing him as a national hero in the same manner as other released hostages who were unques-
tionably fulfilling their role as dedicated government servants at the time they were kidnapped.
Finally, one can credibly and persuasively argue that reports of accusations of criminal
involvement, reported in good faith, should be privileged as a matter of public interest because
law enforcement matters are of inherent interest to any concerned citizen. As Justice Brennan
stated: "The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws
..... " Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43. Some Americans might not have known that drug deals
are negotiated in the Middle East, and they might be troubled by the thought that such deals
were possibly negotiated with the indirect support of an American embassy.
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VI. CONCLUSION
California has a salutary tradition of protecting the free speech
rights of the press. For more than sixty years, one form of protection has
been the statutory recognition of a qualified privilege under California
Civil Code section 47(3).274 This privilege has been applied by the judici-
ary to mass media reports concerning private figures which address mat-
ters of public concern. Now the law is in a state of confusion. As a
result of the Second District Court of Appeal's ruling in Rancho La
Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court,2 71 continued recognition of California's
public interest privilege, as codified in section 47(3), is in jeopardy. If the
Rancho La Costa interpretation becomes the controlling rule in the state,
lower courts will have difficulty fairly applying the court's stafidard, def-
amation litigation will become increasingly complex, and the type of
speech that first amendment experts consider vital to the functioning of a
representative democracy might be chilled.
To strike the best balance between the overall interests of society
and the needs of private figure defamation plaintiffs, the California
Supreme Court, in Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,2 76 should
endorse the Fourth District Court of Appeal's broad interpretation of
section 47(3) as outlined in Rollenhagen v. City of Orange.2 7 7 Speech
concerning compelling public issues deserves special legal protection,
whether the actors involved are public officials, public figures or private
figures. Formal adoption of the Rollenhagen interpretation of section
47(3), where the analysis focuses on the subject matter of the defamatory
publication rather than the plaintiff's individual status, would best pro-
tect news reports which are published for the public's benefit. And a
private figure plaintiff would not be greatly disadvantaged by the recogni-
tion of a public interest privilege because he would only have to prove
statutory malice, rather than the more onerous burden of proving consti-
tutional actual malice, to overcome the privilege.
Jeff Arrington
274. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 5 for the text
of § 47(3).
275. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
For a thorough discussion of Rancho La Costa, see supra notes 38-126 and accompanying text.
276. No. L.A. 32210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. hearing granted June 26, 1986). For a discussion of the
controversy underlying Van Nuys Publishing, see supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
277. 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981). For a thorough analysis of Rol-
lenhagen, see supra notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
1612
